By Jelger Groeneveld
Last updated on 10 September 2025
The local elections in Georgia will take place on Saturday 4 October 2025. The municipal elections are highly controversial among Georgian society and its political elite. They take place in the context of a mass-boycott of the pro-Western opposition in the fall-out of the disputed 2024 Parliamentary election. Participation in the elections is a highly divisive subject among the opposition.
Table of contents
- 1. Political context
- 2. Electoral System
- 3. Election observation
- 4. Parties
- 5. Results
- Appendix
- 1. Election summary national distribution
- 2. Mayoral results
- 3. Municipal council results
- 4. Electoral districts
- References and footnotes
1. Political context
After the parliamentary elections of 2024, the pro-western opposition went into a boycott of parliament, claiming the parliament was illegitimately elected due to rigged elections. The aftermath of these elections affected the course of the local elections of 4 October 2025. Throughout Spring and Summer of 2025, the opposition groups argued among each other to extend the boycott to the local elections. According to them the elections would be “illegitimate” and in any case not “free or fair”. By June 2025, when party registration for the elections opened, the positions became more clear, exposing deep divisions.
Gakharia for Georgia and the remainder of the Strong Georgia coalition (its flag bearer Lelo and Citizens) decided to participate in the local elections, working together by putting forward common candidates, to the scorn of United National Movement and Coalition for Change and their affiliated parties, which committed to a total boycott. A public survey indicated that a majority of 54% supported the opposition taking part in the elections.1Eurasianet, 26 June 2025, Georgia’s fractured opposition wrestles with whether to contest local elections
1.1 Opposition disunity and disintegration
Over time after the parliamentary elections of 2024, cracks appeared in the opposition unity, partially due to disappointment in the outcomes and the lack of perspective of a quick resolve of the political stalemate. Unity was also distorted due to disagreements over the course of action towards the local elections in October 2025.
In March 2025, Freedom Square left the Strong Georgia coalition. They transformed their movement into a political party and said to independently pursue their ideals on justice, security, and freedom. 2Civil Georgia, 9 March 2025, “Freedom Square” Movement Becomes Political Party Three months later Ana Dolidze announced the departure of “For the People” from the same coalition, stating she wanted to pursue an independent course for her party. She indicated the coalition served its purpose, but that it is now time for the party to return to their “own agenda”.3Civil Georgia, 6 June 2025, Anna Dolidze’s For People Leaves Lelo-Led Strong Georgia Coalition
She also emphasized her priority to cement the relations with the Party of European Socialists (PES), the social-democratic European umbrella party, to obtain observer status in PES. Strong Georgia’s lead party Lelo is a member of the European liberal ALDE.4IPN, 6 June 2025, Ana Dolidze and For People Party leave Strong Georgia coalition, return to independent activities In April 2025, three leading figures of the Girchi-More Freedom left the party.51TV, 3 April 2025, Tsotne Koberidze, Badri Grigalashvili, Boris Chele Kurua quit ‘Girchi – More Freedom
On 24 July 2024 Dolidze announced not to participate in the local elections. However, “For the People” would not join the boycott of the other opposition parties. Dolidze said she would “spending time and resources on going from village to village and urging people not to do something is wrong”. She added citizens know very well where justice and injustice is. “It is necessary to release political prisoners and hold fair, new parliamentary elections. This should be the goal.”6Netgazeti, 24 July 2025, ანა დოლიძე მუნიციპალურ არჩევნებში მონაწილეობას არ მიიღებს
1.2 Lelo-Gakharia participation and “traitors”
Meanwhile, both Gakharia for Georgia and Lelo denounced throughout Spring 2025 to provide clarity whether they would boycott or participate in the local elections in October 2025. Citizens‘ leader Aleko Elisashvili floated the idea of participation as well.7IPN, 27 June 2025, Politics 27.06.2025 / 21:49aa Aleko Elisashvili: Let’s sit down, talk, and unite around Salome Zurabishvili – let’s not be afraid to say it, let’s proclaim it. She wouldn’t be a bad candidate for mayor Other opposition parties and blocs committed to a boycott and expected this as well from the dissenting parties.8The Messenger Online, 28 May 2025, Georgian Opposition Parties Face Dilemmas Elene Khostaria from Droa / Coalition for Change went into a hunger strike on 27 June 2025, vowing only to end it if all opposition parties committed to boycotting the local elections.9OC Media, 30 June 2025, Georgian opposition politician Khoshtaria starts hunger strike, joined by colleague and activists She was the the only leader of CfC not sent to prison. A few days later she quit her hunger strike.
On 5 July 2025, Strong Georgia – at that moment only existing of Lelo and Citizens – announced they would run in the local elections on 4 October 2025. In a statement they clarified that the fight against the Georgian Dream regime has multiple directions, and that they decided to fight “Ivanishvili’s Russian-Oligarchic regime” in this direction.10Civil Georgia, 5 July 2025, Lelo/Strong Georgia to Run in October Local Elections, Three Senior Members Dissent Freedom Square, Strong Georgia’s former partner, distanced itself from the decision, but emphasized they would not waste energy with internal opposition disputes.111TV, 5 July 2025, Freedom Square criticizes Strong Georgia for participating in elections
That advise was not picked up by other opposition parties. Droa’s Elene Khostaria questioned whether Lelo is “weak or a traitor”.12IPN, 5 July 2025, Elene Khoshtaria: What a 4% party like Lelo does certainly doesn’t determine Georgia’s fate. Whether they are weak or traitors – let history judge that; As for us, let’s focus on our work Tina Bokuchava of UNM used similar words, calling it a a “betrayal of the common struggle, not a fight to save the country, but a deal with the regime for an honorable second place”. She added that it is “Lelo’s moral death, we will witness their electoral death as well.”13IPN, 5 July 2025, Tina Bokuchava: This is a betrayal of the common struggle, a deal with the regime in exchange for an honorable second place. Today we witnessed Lelo’s moral death — in October, we will witness their electoral death as well
On the other hand, Gakharia for Georgia agreed with Lelo’s decision as the “right one” and offered to join forces with common neutral candidates.14IPN, 5 July 2025, Levan Gogichaishvili: Lelo – Strong Georgia’s decision is the right one, and I support it. We need to nominate joint, neutral candidates. As for the United National Movement, I’m not interested in their opinion For Georgia’s Levan Gogichaisvili added his argument for participation:
“Participation does not mean legitimizing the government — and you will never convince a single European, for whom municipal elections are a democratic foundation, that refusing to participate is the right move.”
Lelo’s decision triggered three leading members to step down from their political council functions in the party. Saba Buadze, Ana Natsvlishvili and Dea Metreveli said they disagreed with the decision to participate and cannot reconcile with that. However, they said they would remain member of the party.15IPN, 5 July 2025, Ana Natsvlishvili has left the political council of “Lelo – For a Strong Georgia”
On 14 July 2025 representatives of Lelo and For Georgia jointly announced they have agreed on cooperation in the local elections. They agreed to try to find “common candidates for mayors”, aiming for “non-partisan” and “neutral” figures, or alternatively, joint party nominees. The same would apply to majoritarian candidates as well. However, no comments were made on forming joint party lists.16Civil Georgia, 14 July 2025, Lelo, Gakharia’s For Georgia Agree to Cooperate for Local Elections
2. Electoral system
Fundamental changes to the local election code were implemented by Georgiab Dream less than a year before the municipal elections, which took the form of a manipulation according to analysts. The adoption of these changes violated international standards, undermining the principle of equal voting power—an essential element for upholding the fundamental right to equal suffrage. The local election system was changed in 2021 for the local elections after EU mediation, to make the system more representative, reducing systemic advantages for the ruling power.
For the 2025 election, the ruling Georgian Dream reverted those changes. The new amendments were designed to create advantages for GD, fundamentally violating a core condition for upholding the principles of democratic elections as outlined in the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.17EPDE, 22 August 2025, Election report 2025 – Municipal Elections in Georgia: Assessment of the Pre-Election Environment
2.1 Changes
Among those changes was abolishing the 40% threshold for winning the single-mandate majoritarian districts, making it a first-past-the-post and single-round system, which serves the interests of Georgian Dream. Also, the proportion of the majoritarian seats was increased again to the situation prior to 2021. In that year, the majoritarian component was reduced to create a more proportional environment. For capital Tbilisi this means the city council will now consist of 25 majoritarian and 25 proportional seats, instead of the 10-40 division of 2021. In rural municipalities the changes are less radical, but still takes advantage of the most popular (but not necessarily mmajority) party, especially in combination with the abolished majoritarian threshold and two-round system. Furthermore, the threshold for the proportional component increased, combined with an electoral formula to favor the party with the best result.
2.2 Electronic voting
Similarly to 2024, the local elections are held with electronic means in 75% of the polling stations, affecting 90% of the voters. In the remaining polling stations the conventional way was applied. These polling stations were located in the countryside and were mostly too far away from the district center for quick assistance if problems appear with electronic equipment. The electronic technology was not used for the vote, but to electronically scan the ballot immediately after the vote. This was intended to fasten the release of preliminary results, to be followed with a manual count. Only the manual count is legal for the final summary protocol. Also, voter identity verification was done by electronic means, to prevent double voting or impersonation. Below: an instruction video of the election authorities showing the voting procedure including the electronic scan immediately after the vote.
Georgia moved in 2024 to a partial electronic voting mechanism based on recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR. Delayed result publication and imbalances in summary protocols in the 2020 elections aggravated public trust in the results and the integrity of the entire electoral process. Public trust in the elections in Georgia has suffered for years from a range of recurring violations, irregularities and procedural errors.18International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), 22 November 2023, Use Of Electronic Technologies In The Voting Process: Assessment Of Electronic Machines Introduced In Georgia
Smartmatic provides the electronic technology for the vote scanning.19European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE), 2 April 2024, New Voting Technologies In Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections The company, using a web of foreign holdings to obscure its Venezuelan origins, has come under scrutiny for allegations of bribery in the Philippines. In Georgia, the central election commission got critical questions about the tender procedure in which Smartmatic was the only bidder.20Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 19 August 2024, სკანდალი ფირმის გარშემო, რომლის ტექნოლოგიებითაც ტარდება არჩევნები საქართველოში – ქრთამი, ფულის გათეთრება და აშშ-ის ბრალდებები
3. Election observation
The Georgian government initially did not invite the OSCE ODIHR for an election observation mission, calling this “unnecessary”, despite calls from the organization to do so.21Civil Georgia, 18 June 2025, Kobakhidze Says ODIHR Monitoring of Local Elections ‘Unnecessary’ Prime minister Irali Kobakhidze claimed ODIHR typically does not observe local elections, doing so only in “exceptional” cases. However, the OSCE monitored all Georgian local elections since 2006, with the exception in 2014 when the OSCE was invited, but experienced financial problems and could not send a mission.
Out of the blue, the Georgian government indicated on 6 September 2025, less than a month before election day, it invited the OSCE “to leave no question about the elections”. However, the OSCE typically maintains a timeframe of four to six months in order to prepare and be able to send a proper Long Term (LTO) and Short Term (STO) mission. As such, the OSCE had to decline the invitation “with regret”, as the invitation “at such a late stage prevents meaningful observation”.22Civil Georgia, 9 September 2025, OSCE/ODIHR ‘Will Not Be In Position’ to Observe Georgia’s Local Elections
The central election commission hailed the registered local and international observers so far on 10 September 2025. The foreign groups registered at that point were mostly central election commission missions from the less-democratic world: Asia and Africa. The local groups were mostly tied with the ruling party and are little known.23Civil Georgia, 9 September 2025, CEC Hails ‘International Observers’ but Most are Obscure
4. Parties and candidates
A total of 17 political parties registered for the elections. Fourteen of these were accepted by the CESKO election commission to be on the ballot.
4.1 Registered parties
On 8 August 2025 the registration period ended, the 57th day before election day, which was determined on 4 October 2025. The central election commission CESKO registered seventeen parties, out of which three were singled out and rejected. Key parties were ruling Georgian Dream, Lelo (“Strong Georgia”) and Gakharia for Georgia. Other known but significantly smaller parties that registered were Girchi (NPC), Alliance of Patriots and the old but marginalized Green Party.
The Conservatives for Georgia is a new front of the far-right, pro-Russian Alt-Info group. Other registered groups are highly marginal fringe parties, which never had any success in previous elections. Long timer Kakha Kukava also regsistered with his Free Georgia. The Left Alliance is a small outlet of former members of the Labour Party, which is the main absentee of this category.24Radio Tavisupleba, 9 August 2025, ცნობილია, რომელი პარტიები მიიღებენ 2025 წლის თვითმმართველობის არჩევნებში მონაწილეობას People’s Power, the proxy spin-off from Georgian Dream that registered itself als “opposition” in parliament, announced in August 2025 it would participate jointly with Georgian Dream, illustrating their pseudo-opposition play and the farce of it.251TV, 7 August 2025, People’s Power to participate in local elections in coalition with Georgian Dream
CESKO also determined the election numbers with which the parties participate. Parties have the freedom to request a specific number. Most larger parties use the same number for branding purposes, claiming the numbers ahead in the process. So did seven parties, including those who committed to the boycott, such as UNM (#5) and Coalition for Change (#4). The list was released on 18 July 2025.26CESKO, 18 July 2025, Sequence Numbers Of Election Subjects However, after the party registration was complete, the number claims of parties that did not register were forfeited and their numbers were released to be appointed by CESKO to other parties. As UNM did not register, it lost its number it used for more than 20 years. Also Coalition for Change lost its number. Both numbers were recycled for smaller parties.
Accepted and rejected parties for local elections 4 October 2025
Initially 17 parties registered for participation by the deadline of 7 August 2025, while three of those were “under consideration” at the time. On 14 August 2025, CESKO announced those three were rejected for registration for legal reasons. The indicated party leader and/or representatives were not properly registered in the official party registry or there were other similar naming discrepancies with the official party registry.
The next step in the process is the submission of valid candidate lists, which means parties can still drop out if they fail to submit a valid candidate list. The following tabel shows the parties ordered by their election number. The last column gives the number of the candidates on the ballot, with the link to the full list.
Registered election subjects for the local elections 4 October 2025 | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
# | Party | Leader | Remark / Candidates | |||
1 | Homeland, Language Religion „მამული, ენა, სარწმუნოება“ |
Zaur Khachidze | ||||
3 | Conservatives for Georgia „კონსერვატორები საქართველოსთვის“ |
Giorgi Kardava | ||||
4 | Georgian Unity ქართველ ერთობა |
Gaioz Mamaladze | ||||
5 | Our United Georgia „ჩვენი გაერთიანებული საქართველო“ |
Isaki Giorgadze | ||||
7 | Free Georgia „თავისუფალი საქართველო“ |
Kakha Kukava | ||||
8 | Alliance of Patriots of Georgia „საქართველოს პატრიოტთა ალიანსი“ |
Davit Tarkhan-Mouravi | ||||
9 | Strong Georgia-Lelo ძლიერი საქართველო-ლელო |
Mamuka Khazaradze | ||||
10 | Left Alliance „მემარცხენე ალიანსი“ |
Konstantine Gugushvili | ||||
11 | Sakartvelo (or “Georgia”) „საქართველო“ |
Giorgi Liluashvili | ||||
12 | Green Party მწვანეთა პარტია |
Giorgi Gachechiladze | ||||
14 | People’s Government „სახალხო ხელისუფლება“ |
Marina Kurdadze | ||||
25 | Gakharia for Georgia „გახარია საქართველოსთვის“ |
Giorgi Gakharia | ||||
36 | Girchi გირჩი |
Iago Khvichia | ||||
41 | Georgian Dream ქართული ოცნება |
Irakli Kobakhidze | ||||
Rejected election subjects with reason | ||||||
2 | „დემოკრატთა ალიანსი“ Democratic Alliance |
Giorgi Buchukuri | Art. 142, #4 | |||
6 | Third Way „მესამე გზა“ |
Giorgi Tumanishvili | Art. 142, #4, #5b, #5c | |||
13 | Unity and Development Party of Georgia „საქართველოს ერთობისა და განვითარების პარტია“ |
Kamal Muradkhanov | Art. 142, #4, #5a, #5b | |||
Source: CESKO Registry electoral subjects:27CESKO, Election Subjects; Final registration of parties;28CESKO, 8 August 2025, Registered Election Subjects for the October 4, 2025 Municipal Elections (pdf); CESKO Rejected parties – August 2024:29CESKO, 14 August 2025 Parties that were denied registration (pdf); Election Code:30Legislative Herald of Georgia, Election Code of Georgia, consolidated version 26 June 2024 |
4.2 Mayoral candidates
An important component of the local elections are the mayoral elections in all 64 municipalities. In Tbilisi nine candidates were registered, with incumbent Kakha Kaladze of Georgian Dream being the most important. He seeks a third term. The most important opposition challenger is Irakli Kupradze, secretary general of Lelo and common candidate with Gakharia for Georgia. Lelo and Gakharia for Georgia have equally divided common candidates in 36 municipalities. In 25 municipalities they are the only competitor against GD.
Gakharia for Georgia has candidates in the three main cities after Tbilisi: Batumi, Rustavi and Kutaisi. In the fifth largest city Poti the candidate of Gakharia for Georgia was refused. Georgian Dream candidate, incumbent Beka Vacharadze, is the sole candidate for mayor in this city. In 24 other municipalities Georgian Dream is the sole contender for the mayor position.31CESKO, 9 September 2025, Mayoral candidates
9. Appendix
1. Election summary national distribution
The complete list of the election results for all participating parties, ordered by their list number (ballot order).
Party name & list number | Votes | % | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Homeland, Language Religion | |||||
3 | Conservatives for Georgia | |||||
4 | Georgian Unity | |||||
5 | Our United Georgia | |||||
7 | Free Georgia | |||||
8 | Alliance of Patriots of Georgia | |||||
9 | Strong Georgia-Lelo | |||||
10 | Left Alliance | |||||
11 | Sakartvelo (“Georgia”) | |||||
12 | Green Party | |||||
14 | People’s Government | |||||
25 | Gakharia for Georgia | |||||
36 | Girchi – New Political Center | |||||
41 | Georgian Dream | |||||
Total | ||||||
Invalid ballots | ||||||
Total cast votes | ||||||
Registered voters and turnout | ||||||
Source: |
2. Mayoral results
3. Municipal results
4. Electoral districts
The following tabel shows the electoral districts with the number of registered voters, actual votes and the turnout – according to the district protocols. Tbilisi was divided in 10 electoral districts (not to be confused with the majoritarian districts).
# | District | Reg. voters |
Cast votes |
Valid votes |
Invalid votes32According to the district protocols. |
Turnout | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Tbilisi – Mtatsminda | 51919 | % | % | ||||
2 | Tbilisi – Vake | 111302 | % | % | ||||
3 | Tbilisi – Saburtalo | 145404 | % | % | ||||
4 | Tbilisi – Krtsanisi | 43576 | % | % | ||||
5 | Tbilisi – Isani | 117796 | % | % | ||||
6 | Tbilisi – Samgori | 150837 | % | % | ||||
7 | Tbilisi – Chugureti | 59187 | % | % | ||||
8 | Tbilisi – Didube | 69813 | % | % | ||||
9 | Tbilisi – Nadzaladevi | 135301 | % | % | ||||
10 | Tbilisi – Gldani | 150738 | % | % | ||||
11 | Sagarejo | 46148 | % | % | ||||
12 | Gurjaani | 48775 | % | % | ||||
13 | Sighnaghi | 27949 | % | % | ||||
14 | Dedoplistskaro | 20084 | % | % | ||||
15 | Lagodekhi | 38106 | % | % | ||||
16 | Kvareli | 27044 | % | % | ||||
17 | Telavi | 54249 | % | % | ||||
18 | Akhmeta | 29385 | % | % | ||||
19 | Tianeti | 10756 | % | % | ||||
20 | Rustavi | 105895 | % | % | ||||
21 | Gardabani | 73633 | % | % | ||||
22 | Marneuli | 99892 | % | % | ||||
23 | Bolnisi | 55681 | % | % | ||||
24 | Dmanisi | 22863 | % | % | ||||
25 | Tsalka | 19358 | % | % | ||||
26 | Tetritskaro | 19982 | % | % | ||||
27 | Mtskheta | 44772 | % | % | ||||
28 | Dusheti | 27270 | % | % | ||||
29 | Kazbegi | 5827 | % | % | ||||
30 | Kaspi | 38550 | % | % | ||||
32 | Gori | 110571 | % | % | ||||
33 | Kareli | 36962 | % | % | ||||
35 | Khashuri | 47396 | % | % | ||||
36 | Borjomi | 26593 | % | % | ||||
37 | Akhaltsikhe | 33048 | % | % | ||||
38 | Adigeni | 15094 | % | % | ||||
39 | Aspindza | 9577 | % | % | ||||
40 | Akhalkalaki | 37287 | % | % | ||||
41 | Ninotsminda | 20504 | % | % | ||||
43 | Oni | 6918 | % | % | ||||
44 | Ambrolauri | 11538 | % | % | ||||
45 | Tsageri | 10373 | % | % | ||||
46 | Lentekhi | 5735 | % | % | ||||
47 | Mestia | 8993 | % | % | ||||
48 | Kharagauli | 18450 | % | % | ||||
49 | Terjola | 31437 | % | % | ||||
50 | Sachkhere | 39498 | % | % | ||||
51 | Zestafoni | 52032 | % | % | ||||
52 | Baghdadi | 20237 | % | % | ||||
53 | Vani | 23015 | % | % | ||||
54 | Samtredia | 42981 | % | % | ||||
55 | Khoni | 21253 | % | % | ||||
56 | Chiatura | 40131 | % | % | ||||
57 | Tkibuli | 19629 | % | % | ||||
58 | Tskaltubo | 48392 | % | % | ||||
59 | Kutaisi | 151742 | % | % | ||||
60 | Ozurgeti | 57187 | % | % | ||||
61 | Lanchkhuti | 26745 | % | % | ||||
62 | Chokhatauri | 17131 | % | % | ||||
63 | Abasha | 19334 | % | % | ||||
64 | Senaki | 37734 | % | % | ||||
65 | Martvili | 30282 | % | % | ||||
66 | Khobi | 25978 | % | % | ||||
67 | Zugdidi | 116309 | % | % | ||||
68 | Tsalenjikha | 27184 | % | % | ||||
69 | Chkhorotsku | 20468 | % | % | ||||
70 | Poti | 40220 | % | % | ||||
79 | Batumi | 155473 | % | % | ||||
80 | Keda | 15519 | % | % | ||||
81 | Kobuleti | 65530 | % | % | ||||
82 | Shuakhevi | 14301 | % | % | ||||
83 | Khelvachauri | 42754 | % | % | ||||
84 | Khulo | 23129 | % | % | ||||
Total | 3,476,140 | % | % | |||||
Sources: CESKO. Number of voters per 15 July 2025;33CESKO, Number of voters per electoral district |