2025 Local Elections of Georgia

By Jelger Groeneveld
Last updated on 21 October 2025

The local elections in Georgia took place on Saturday 4 October 2025. The municipal elections were considered to be highly controversial among Georgian society and its political elite, specifically the opposition against ruling Georgian Dream. The elections took place in the context of a mass-boycott of the pro-Western opposition in the fall-out of the disputed 2024 Parliamentary election. Participation in the elections was a highly divisive subject among the opposition.

Only a part of the pro-Western opposition participated in the local elections, with the boycotting part calling citizens not to vote, resulting in Georgian Dream sweeping all municipal councils and mayor positions.

1. Political context

After the parliamentary elections of 2024, the pro-western opposition went into a boycott of parliament, claiming the parliament was illegitimately elected due to rigged elections. The aftermath of these elections affected the course of the local elections of 4 October 2025. Throughout Spring and Summer of 2025, the opposition groups argued among each other to extend the boycott to the local elections. According to them the elections would be “illegitimate” and in any case not “free or fair”. By June 2025, when party registration for the elections opened, the positions became more clear, exposing deep divisions.

Gakharia for Georgia and the remainder of  the Strong Georgia coalition (its flag bearer Lelo and Citizens) decided to participate in the local elections, working together by putting forward common candidates, to the scorn of United National Movement and Coalition for Change and their affiliated parties, which committed to a total boycott. A public survey indicated that a majority of 54% supported the opposition taking part in the elections.¹Eurasianet, 26 June 2025, Georgia’s fractured opposition wrestles with whether to contest local elections

1.1 Opposition disunity and disintegration

Over time after the parliamentary elections of 2024, cracks appeared in the opposition unity, partially due to disappointment in the outcomes and the lack of perspective of a quick resolve of the political stalemate. Unity was also distorted due to disagreements over the course of action towards the local elections in October 2025.

In March 2025, Freedom Square left the Strong Georgia coalition. They transformed their movement into a political party and said to independently pursue their ideals on justice, security, and freedom. ²Civil Georgia, 9 March 2025, “Freedom Square” Movement Becomes Political Party Three months later Ana Dolidze announced the departure of “For the People” from the same coalition, stating she wanted to pursue an independent course for her party. She indicated the coalition served its purpose, but that it is now time for the party to return to their “own agenda”.³Civil Georgia, 6 June 2025, Anna Dolidze’s For People Leaves Lelo-Led Strong Georgia Coalition

She also emphasized her priority to cement the relations with the Party of European Socialists (PES), the social-democratic European umbrella party, to obtain observer status in PES. Strong Georgia’s lead party Lelo is a member of the European liberal ALDE.⁴IPN, 6 June 2025, Ana Dolidze and For People Party leave Strong Georgia coalition, return to independent activities In April 2025, three leading figures of the Girchi-More Freedom left the party.⁵1TV, 3 April 2025, Tsotne Koberidze, Badri Grigalashvili, Boris Chele Kurua quit ‘Girchi – More Freedom

On 24 July 2024 Dolidze announced not to participate in the local elections. However, “For the People” would not join the boycott of the other opposition parties. Dolidze said she would “spending time and resources on going from village to village and urging people not to do something is wrong”. She added citizens know very well where justice and injustice is. “It is necessary to release political prisoners and hold fair, new parliamentary elections. This should be the goal.”⁶Netgazeti, 24 July 2025, ანა დოლიძე მუნიციპალურ არჩევნებში მონაწილეობას არ მიიღებს

1.2 Lelo-Gakharia participation and “traitors”

Meanwhile, both Gakharia for Georgia and Lelo denounced throughout Spring 2025 to provide clarity whether they would boycott or participate in the local elections in October 2025. Citizens‘ leader Aleko Elisashvili floated the idea of participation as well.⁷IPN, 27 June 2025, Politics 27.06.2025 / 21:49aa Aleko Elisashvili: Let’s sit down, talk, and unite around Salome Zurabishvili – let’s not be afraid to say it, let’s proclaim it. She wouldn’t be a bad candidate for mayor Other opposition parties and blocs committed to a boycott and expected this as well from the dissenting parties.⁸The Messenger Online, 28 May 2025, Georgian Opposition Parties Face Dilemmas Elene Khostaria from Droa / Coalition for Change went into a hunger strike on 27 June 2025, vowing only to end it if all opposition parties committed to boycotting the local elections.⁹OC Media, 30 June 2025, Georgian opposition politician Khoshtaria starts hunger strike, joined by colleague and activists She was the the only leader of CfC not sent to prison. A few days later she quit her hunger strike.

On 5 July 2025, Strong Georgia – at that moment only existing of Lelo and Citizens – announced they would run in the local elections on 4 October 2025. In a statement they clarified that the fight against the Georgian Dream regime has multiple directions, and that they decided to fight “Ivanishvili’s Russian-Oligarchic regime” in this direction.¹⁰Civil Georgia, 5 July 2025, Lelo/Strong Georgia to Run in October Local Elections, Three Senior Members Dissent Freedom Square, Strong Georgia’s former partner, distanced itself from the decision, but emphasized they would not waste energy with internal opposition disputes.¹¹1TV, 5 July 2025, Freedom Square criticizes Strong Georgia for participating in elections

That advise was not picked up by other opposition parties. Droa’s Elene Khostaria questioned whether Lelo is “weak or a traitor”.¹²IPN, 5 July 2025, Elene Khoshtaria: What a 4% party like Lelo does certainly doesn’t determine Georgia’s fate. Whether they are weak or traitors – let history judge that; As for us, let’s focus on our work Tina Bokuchava of UNM used similar words, calling it a a “betrayal of the common struggle, not a fight to save the country, but a deal with the regime for an honorable second place”. She added that it is “Lelo’s moral death, we will witness their electoral death as well.”¹³IPN, 5 July 2025, Tina Bokuchava: This is a betrayal of the common struggle, a deal with the regime in exchange for an honorable second place. Today we witnessed Lelo’s moral death — in October, we will witness their electoral death as well

On the other hand, Gakharia for Georgia agreed with Lelo’s decision as the “right one” and offered to join forces with common neutral candidates.¹⁴IPN, 5 July 2025, Levan Gogichaishvili: Lelo – Strong Georgia’s decision is the right one, and I support it. We need to nominate joint, neutral candidates. As for the United National Movement, I’m not interested in their opinion For Georgia’s Levan Gogichaisvili added his argument for participation:

“Participation does not mean legitimizing the government — and you will never convince a single European, for whom municipal elections are a democratic foundation, that refusing to participate is the right move.”

Lelo’s decision triggered three leading members to step down from their political council functions in the party. Saba Buadze, Ana Natsvlishvili and Dea Metreveli said they disagreed with the decision to participate and cannot reconcile with that. However, they said they would remain member of the party.¹⁵IPN, 5 July 2025, Ana Natsvlishvili has left the political council of “Lelo – For a Strong Georgia”

On 14 July 2025 representatives of Lelo and For Georgia jointly announced they have agreed on cooperation in the local elections. They agreed to try to find “common candidates for mayors”, aiming for “non-partisan” and “neutral” figures, or alternatively, joint party nominees. The same would apply to majoritarian candidates as well. However, no comments were made on forming joint party lists.¹⁶Civil Georgia, 14 July 2025, Lelo, Gakharia’s For Georgia Agree to Cooperate for Local Elections

2. Electoral system

Fundamental changes to the local election code were implemented by Georgiab Dream less than a year before the municipal elections, which took the form of a manipulation according to analysts. The adoption of these changes violated international standards, undermining the principle of equal voting power—an essential element for upholding the fundamental right to equal suffrage. The local election system was changed in 2021 for the local elections after EU mediation, to make the system more representative, reducing systemic advantages for the ruling power.

For the 2025 election, the ruling Georgian Dream reverted those changes. The new amendments were designed to create advantages for GD, fundamentally violating a core condition for upholding the principles of democratic elections as outlined in the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.¹⁷EPDE, 22 August 2025, Election report 2025 – Municipal Elections in Georgia: Assessment of the Pre-Election Environment

2.1 Changes

Among those changes was abolishing the 40% threshold for winning the single-mandate majoritarian districts, making it a first-past-the-post and single-round system, which serves the interests of Georgian Dream. Also, the proportion of the majoritarian seats was increased again to the situation prior to 2021. In that year, the majoritarian component was reduced overall to create a more proportional environment. Furthermore, the threshold for the proportional component increased, combined with an electoral formula to favor the party with the best result.

For capital Tbilisi this means the city council will now consist of 25 single-mandate and 25 proportional seats, instead of the 10-40 division of 2021. All other municipalities, including the cities, have a fixed 15 proportional seats with a 4% threshold. In the “self-governing” cities Batumi, Rustavi, Kutaisi and Poti there is a fixed number of 10 single-mandate districts. In rural municipalities the changes vary per municipality as the district system is now based on the number of administrative communities and villages, rather than a fixed proportion. It is not proportional or linear to the population. Sparsely populated Tsalka municipality for example now has 30 single-mandate districts, while the populous Marneuli municipality has 20 districts.

2.2 Electronic voting

Similarly to 2024, the local elections are held with electronic means in 75% of the polling stations, affecting 90% of the voters. In the remaining polling stations the conventional way was applied. These polling stations were located in the countryside and were mostly too far away from the district center for quick assistance if problems appear with electronic equipment. The electronic technology was not used for the vote, but to electronically scan the ballot immediately after the vote. This was intended to fasten the release of preliminary results, to be followed with a manual count. Only the manual count is legal for the final summary protocol. Also, voter identity verification was done by electronic means, to prevent double voting or impersonation. Below: an instruction video of the election authorities showing the voting procedure including the electronic scan immediately after the vote.

Georgia moved in 2024 to a partial electronic voting mechanism based on recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR. Delayed result publication and imbalances in summary protocols in the 2020 elections aggravated public trust in the results and the integrity of the entire electoral process. Public trust in the elections in Georgia has suffered for years from a range of recurring violations, irregularities and procedural errors.¹⁸International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), 22 November 2023, Use Of Electronic Technologies In The Voting Process: Assessment Of Electronic Machines Introduced In Georgia

Smartmatic provides the electronic technology for the vote scanning.¹⁹European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE), 2 April 2024, New Voting Technologies In Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections The company, using a web of foreign holdings to obscure its Venezuelan origins, has come under scrutiny for allegations of bribery in the Philippines. In Georgia, the central election commission got critical questions about the tender procedure in which Smartmatic was the only bidder.²⁰Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 19 August 2024, სკანდალი ფირმის გარშემო, რომლის ტექნოლოგიებითაც ტარდება არჩევნები საქართველოში – ქრთამი, ფულის გათეთრება და აშშ-ის ბრალდებები

3. Election observation

The Georgian government initially did not invite the OSCE ODIHR for an election observation mission, calling this “unnecessary”, despite calls from the organization to do so.²¹Civil Georgia, 18 June 2025, Kobakhidze Says ODIHR Monitoring of Local Elections ‘Unnecessary’ Prime minister Irali Kobakhidze claimed ODIHR typically does not observe local elections, doing so only in “exceptional” cases. However, the OSCE monitored all Georgian local elections since 2006, with the exception in 2014 when the OSCE was invited, but experienced financial problems and could not send a mission.

Out of the blue, the Georgian government indicated on 6 September 2025, less than a month before election day, it invited the OSCE “to leave no question about the elections”. However, the OSCE typically maintains a timeframe of four to six months in order to prepare and be able to send a proper Long Term (LTO) and Short Term (STO) mission. As such, the OSCE had to decline the invitation “with regret”, as the invitation “at such a late stage prevents meaningful observation”.²²Civil Georgia, 9 September 2025, OSCE/ODIHR ‘Will Not Be In Position’ to Observe Georgia’s Local Elections

The central election commission hailed the registered local and international observers so far on 10 September 2025. The foreign groups registered at that point were mostly central election commission missions from the less-democratic world: Asia and Africa. The local groups were mostly tied with the ruling party and are little known.²³Civil Georgia, 9 September 2025, CEC Hails ‘International Observers’ but Most are Obscure

4. Parties and candidates

A total of 17 political parties registered for the elections. Fourteen of these were accepted by the CESKO election commission to be on the ballot. Twelve parties submitted candidate lists for the proportional election in Tbilisi, all with 50+ candidates each. Throughout the rest of the country, there were a total of 4506 candidates for the proportional election.

For the single-mandate district vote a total of 2010 candidates were registered, with 5-8 candidates in each of the capital districts. In the other municipalities, Georgian Dream was the sole contender in one third of the districts and in most other districts there were two or three contenders. Lelo and Gakharia alternated their district candidates. Nine candidates were nominated for the mayoral election in the capital. In other municipalities the mayoral election was narrowed to one or two candidates. Georgian Dream ran mayor candidates in all municipalities, while Lelo and Gakharia ran common candidates in 36 out of 64.

4.1 Registered parties

On 8 August 2025 the registration period ended, the 57th day before election day, which was determined on 4 October 2025. The central election commission CESKO registered seventeen parties, out of which three were singled out and rejected. Key parties were ruling Georgian Dream, Lelo (“Strong Georgia”) and Gakharia for Georgia. Other known but significantly smaller parties that registered were Girchi (NPC), Alliance of Patriots and the old but marginalized Green Party.

The Conservatives for Georgia is a new front of the far-right, pro-Russian Alt-Info group. Other registered groups are highly marginal fringe parties, which never had any success in previous elections. Long timer Kakha Kukava also regsistered with his Free Georgia. The Left Alliance is a small outlet of former members of the Labour Party, which is the main absentee of this category.²⁴Radio Tavisupleba, 9 August 2025, ცნობილია, რომელი პარტიები მიიღებენ 2025 წლის თვითმმართველობის არჩევნებში მონაწილეობას People’s Power, the proxy spin-off from Georgian Dream that registered itself als “opposition” in parliament, announced in August 2025 it would participate jointly with Georgian Dream, illustrating their pseudo-opposition play and the farce of it.²⁵1TV, 7 August 2025, People’s Power to participate in local elections in coalition with Georgian Dream

CESKO also determined the election numbers with which the parties participate. Parties have the freedom to request a specific number. Most larger parties use the same number for branding purposes, claiming the numbers ahead in the process. So did seven parties, including those who committed to the boycott, such as UNM (#5) and Coalition for Change (#4). The list was released on 18 July 2025.²⁶CESKO, 18 July 2025, Sequence Numbers Of Election Subjects However, after the party registration was complete, the number claims of parties that did not register were forfeited and their numbers were released to be appointed by CESKO to other parties. As UNM did not register, it lost its number it used for more than 20 years. Also Coalition for Change lost its number. Both numbers were recycled for smaller parties.

Upon closure of the candidate registration, the central election commission announced on 23 September 2025 a total of 12 parties submitted candidate lists and mayoral candidates for participation.²⁷CESKO, 23 September 2025, ინფორმაცია მუნიციპალიტეტის ორგანოთა არჩევნებისთვის რეგისტრირებული პარტიული სიების, მერობისა და მაჟორიტარობის კანდიდატების შესახებ All twelve take part in Tbilisi. The small “Georgian Unity” and “Left Alliance” parties did not register any candidates, meaning they dropped out of the elections.

4.2 Single mandate districts

A total of 970 single mandate districts were defined in the 64 municipalities. In Tbilisi there are 25 districts, while the self-governing cities Batumi, Rustavi, Kutaisi and Poti have 10 districts. In all other rural municipalities, the districts are determined based on the local communities and villages, and the size of larger towns and cities. This means that thinly populated, but scattered Tsalka municipality has 30 single mandate districts, while highly populated Marneuli has 20. Overall, the number of single mandate districts vary per municipality between 6 and 35, while the proportionally elected component is fixed at 15 for all municipalities with the exception of Tbilisi (25).

In total 2210 single-mandate candidates were registered.⁴⁶Note: Data was missing of Borjomi districts 36.08 and 36.09 in the available documentation prior to the elections. That is likely a total of 4-6 candidates.. Georgian Dream ran candidates in all districts. In one third (362) they were the sole contender. Especially in Armenian populated Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda they had a free pass in (nearly) all districts, as well as in Sachkhere, the home area of Bidzina Ivanishvili. In most of the other districts there were two (450) or three (217) candidates. In only 58 districts there were 4 or more candidates, concentrating in Tbilisi (5-8) where Georgian Dream, Conservatives for Georgia and Girchi ran candidates in all districts. Lelo (13) and Gakharia (12), which cooperated with common candidates, had all districts covered as well.

Lelo (434) and Gakharia (215) alternated their common candidates throughout municipalities. Only in 16 districts they both ran, where they likely could not agree to a common candidate. The Conservatives for Georgia, the political front for the pro-Russian far-right and ultra-conservative Alt-Info, fielded candidates in 317 districts. The Alliance of Patriots could only nominate seven candidates throughout the country and is clearly out of grace. They peaked in the 2014 locals with more than 6% of the vote.

Intimidation

In the pre-election period, reports surfaced that opposition candidates were pressured and threatened to withdraw from the election. On 29 September 2025, Lelo released a recording of their single-mandate candidate Kara Orujevi (district 22.16, Kizilajlo, Marneuli mun.) being pressured.⁴⁷Civil Georgia, 29 September 2025, Lelo Alleges ‘Pressure, Threats, Bribery’ After Candidates Withdraw in GD’s Favor  This followed earlier reports of various candidates in Marneuli from Lelo being coerced into withdrawal (districts 22.17, Kulari and 22.13, Kesalo). This left various additional districts with Georgian Dream being the only participating party. On 22 September, Lelo’s mayoral candidate in Bolnisi, Asef Chiragov, was also coerced into withdrawal. The area is a Georgian Dream stronghold of the Azeri minority, which is a majority here.

4.3 Mayoral candidates

An important component of the local elections are the mayoral elections in all 64 municipalities. Georgian Dream nominated candidates in all municipalities, unlike other parties. In Tbilisi nine candidates were registered, with incumbent Kakha Kaladze of Georgian Dream being the most important, who was seeking a third term. The most important opposition challenger is Irakli Kupradze, secretary general of Lelo and common candidate with Gakharia for Georgia.

Lelo and Gakharia for Georgia agreed to equally divide common candidates and to coordinate their campaign. They were able to register candidates in 36 municipalities. While Tbilisi was for Lelo, Gakharia for Georgia nominated candidates in the three largest main cities after Tbilisi: Batumi, Rustavi and Kutaisi. In the fifth largest city Poti, the candidate of Gakharia for Georgia was refused. In that city Georgian Dream candidate, incumbent Beka Vacharadze, was the sole candidate for mayor in this city.

In a total of 27 municipalities Georgian Dream was the sole contender for the mayoral position.⁴⁸CESKO, 9 September 2025, Mayoral candidates In 25 municipalities Lelo and Gakharia are the only competitor against Georgian Dream. In nine municipalities there were three candidates, while in Batumi five candidates were registered. In four municipalities a so-called “initiative group” (independents) nominated a candidate.

On 22 September 2025, after the registration closed, Lelo mayoral candidate for Bolnisi Asef Chiragov pulled out of the election and endorsed the candidate of Georgian Dream, Zamur Chitanava. According to Lelo, Chiragov seems to have been pressured and blackmailed in pulling out. Over the previous year Chiragov was a fierce critic of Georgian Dream, making it unlikely his choice was made on a voluntary basis.⁴⁹OC Media, 23 September 2025, Opposition local elections candidate withdraws in favour of Georgian Dream As his withdrawal was too late for the election registration to be changed, he was still on the ballot and citizens could vote for him.

5 Results

As expected Georgian Dream sweeped all sakrebulo and mayoral elections in a single round. Many opposition voters boycotted the election, while others did vote, but they were not even remotely enough for Lelo and Gakharia for Georgia to win any substantial amount of seats. The national average of turnout stood at just 41%, the lowest recorded since 2000. All 64 mayor positions were won by Georgian Dream candidates.

5.1 Sakrebulo election

Georgian Dream gained 1959 of all 2063 sakrebulo seats. All but three of the 970 majoritarian districts were won by Georgian Dream. In Akhalkalaki, Bolnisi, Gardabani, Ninotsminda and Ivanishvili’s home district Sachkhere, the council was 100% won by Georgian Dream. In the other municipalities Lelo and Gakharia were able to win one or two seats amounting to a total of 59 and 26 respectively. Lelo won one majoritarian district seat in Tsageri. Conservatives for Georgia and Girchi won seven seats each in the proportional vote. Kukava’s Free Georgia won two seats, while the Alliance of Patriots won one seat in Kazbegi. Two districts were won by an independent (Martvili and Tsalka).

5.2 Turnout

There was a major disparity in turnout across the municipalities. Main cities Tbilisi, Rustavi, Batumi, Kutaisi, Poti and opposition hotbeds like Zugdidi recorded the lowest turnouts between 31% for Tbilisi to 38% for Batumi. While the national average stood at 41% due to the low turnout in the main cities and the heavy weight of Tbilisi, the brunt of municipalities had a turnout of 40 to 55%, with a few countryside places close to 70% (Aspindza and Keda). In many of the countryside municipalities with a higher turnout, Georgian Dream ran rather uncontested, which begs the question what made the turnout so high.

5.3 Invalid ballots

Across the country an excessive high rate of invalid ballots was recorded, for both the mayoral and the proportional sakrebulo vote. In nearly half of the municipalities this was more than 10% for the mayoral vote, while the national average was 9.0% with a range of 2.5% – 17% per municipality. The national average of the invalid ballots in the proportional sakrebulo vote was 6.1%, with a range of 2% – 10%. In previous election cycles around 2 or 3 percent of the ballots were declared invalid, while in the 2024 election this was 1.7%, indicating the rate in the local elections is clearly off.

However, at the time of writing in mid October 2025, it was unknown whether authorities deliberately invalidated (opposition) ballots, whether (opposition) voters deliberately invalidated their ballot out of protest or whether a combination with other reasons were behind this high rate. There would be no clear incentive for authorities to cheat by invalidating opposition ballots as the elections was very unchallenged for Georgian Dream.

Invalid mayoral ballots

In dissenting cities like Rustavi, Batumi and Kutaisi the invalid ballot rate was well above average: 11 percent, while in capital Tbilisi this was below average at 7.4%. Possibly Tbilisians preferred to stay home instead of  voicing dissent through the ballot. The turnout was the lowest in Tbilisi.

Especially in places with a low turnout and a high degree of invalid ballots, such as Zugdidi (32% turnout and 11% invalid ballots), this impacted even more on the actual participative degree. Correcting for the invalid votes Zugdidi, only 28% of the registered voters actually voted for a mayor. There would not be much reason for Georgian Dream to invalidate valid opposition votes as their candidates did not have a serious challenge. Even for the purpose of saying their mayors are “supported by 80% of the population” instead of 70 or 75% would not be a significant enough gain for the message box of Georgian Dream.

In 26 municipalities there was only a Georgian Dream mayoral candidate on the ballot,⁵⁰In Bolnisi the Lelo candidate Asaf Chiragov had withdrawn, but he was still on the ballot as it was too late to change the ballot. Effectively there were 27 municipalities with only a GD candidate for mayor. In Bolnisi the invalid rate was just 5.2%, while Chiragov received only 3.3% of the vote. but this was not a common factor in the amount of invalidated ballots as an act of dissent against the so-called “North Korean” vote. Concerning this factor it seemed to be along the lines of Georgian Dream loyalty: in hardcore Georgian Dream loyal places such as the southern districts Ninotsminda and Akhaltsikhe, with only a GD candidate running for mayor, the number of invalidated ballots was also the lowest (a few percent).

While in more dissenting West Georgian places such as Bagdati, Martvili and Abasha the rate of invalid ballots was the highest between 15 and 17% in combination with only a Georgian Dream candidate for the mayorship. Remarkably, this was also high in Tsalka, typically a district where the turnout is always among the lowest. This time, the turnout was a bit above average (44%), but with a high degree of invalidated ballots (12.4%). Only a Georgian Dream candidate ran for mayor.

It cannot be excluded that voters were confused how to vote with only one candidate or wanted to object against the sole candidate and thus invalidated the ballot by trying to express an against vote or by intent. Likely it was a mixed bag of factors. When compared with the invalid proportional vote (below), there is an inclination to see a pattern

Invalid ballots proportional vote

The general pattern for the proportional sakrebulo vote was more or less similar, albeit with significantly lower invalidation at 6.1%. But this was still much higher than the typical rate in previous election cycles. Therefore, one could assume this has been at least partially if not wholly a protest – unless Georgian Dream attempted to raise their share, which is unlikely given the minor impact on the unchallenged vote. After all, one opposition seat more or less would not have made a difference at all. The election method for the proportional vote was also the same as for the parliamentary elections in 2024, with the same precincts having electronic counting/scanning devices (the remainder without as in 2024), which excludes wrong use of voting technique.

Unlike the mayoral vote, capital Tbilisi had slightly above average invalid ballot at 6.8%, which makes it relatively consistent with the mayoral rate at 7.4%. In most municipalities that gap is wider: on average 3%, but reaching up to 10%.

In the proportional vote there was always a choice of pro-western opposition parties to vote for, albeit limited to only Lelo and Gakharia for Georgia, while other parties with general participation (Conservatives for Georgia and Alliance of Patriots) can be considered government friendly and opposing western integration. The pattern of the rate of invalid ballots throughout the country was less clear in this part of the election, with the majority of the municipalities within a 1% bandwidth from the national average. In any case, the significant gap  of invalid ballots between the mayoral and proportional council vote of 3% is telling.

What is clear though is that in Samegrelo in the west the invalid rate is the highest, and just as with the mayoral election Tsalka is an interesting outlier, compared to its typical lackluster participation in elections. The cities Rustavi and Batumi are also among those with the highest rate of invalid ballots, while Georgian Dream loyal southern Kakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Javakheti municipalities have a low rate of invalid ballots. These are areas with high degree or majority of ethnic minorities (Azeri and Armenian), which are incumbent loyal.

Invalid ballots and geography: loyal and dissenting regions

In various dimensions there was not a very clear pattern to be found in the high amount of invalid ballots, but a geographical component of dissenting and loyal regions seems to be a leading one, but not watertight. When comparing the gaps between the mayoral and proportional invalid rates in municipalities, the plotted data suggests there might be a relationship between Georgian Dream dissenting areas such as Samegrelo in combination with a sole Georgian Dream candidate on the ballot. There is a significant higher gap between the two rates in those municipalities. The gap is generally minimal in Georgian Dream loyal areas in the South, even in the case of a sole GD candidate.

As always, there are exceptions to the theory. The gap was nearly zero in Chkhorotsku in Samegrelo, but both rates were high there (more than 9%), rendering the difference minimal. A similar pattern is seen in government critical Rustavi where the gap was just 1.2 over a high degree of invalid ballots (10% and 11.2%). In those areas there were opposition mayoral candidates, so this played no role, and the ballots were likely invalidated as a means of protest.

9. Appendix

5. Electoral districts

The following table shows the electoral districts, which correspondent with the municipalities. Capital Tbilisi is divided in 10 electoral districts, not to be confused with the single-mandate districts (25). The table indicates the number of registered voters, actual votes and the turnout – according to the district protocols. There are a total of 64 municipalities.

#	District	Reg. voters	Cast votes	Valid votes	Invalid votes70According to the district protocols.		Turnout
1	Tbilisi – Mtatsminda	52171				%	%
2	Tbilisi – Vake	111929				%	%
3	Tbilisi – Saburtalo	146662				%	%
4	Tbilisi – Krtsanisi	43919				%	%
5	Tbilisi – Isani	118976				%	%
6	Tbilisi – Samgori	152163				%	%
7	Tbilisi – Chugureti	59564				%	%
8	Tbilisi – Didube	70219				%	%
9	Tbilisi – Nadzaladevi	136101				%	%
10	Tbilisi – Gldani	151778				%	%
11	Sagarejo	46706				%	%
12	Gurjaani	49554				%	%
13	Sighnaghi	27640				%	%
14	Dedoplistskaro	20253				%	%
15	Lagodekhi	38532				%	%
16	Kvareli	27328				%	%
17	Telavi	54949				%	%
18	Akhmeta	29598				%	%
19	Tianeti	10884				%	%
20	Rustavi	106654				%	%
21	Gardabani	74755				%	%
22	Marneuli	101962				%	%
23	Bolnisi	56625				%	%
24	Dmanisi	23291				%	%
25	Tsalka	19727				%	%
26	Tetritskaro	20306				%	%
27	Mtskheta	45178				%	%
28	Dusheti	27482				%	%
29	Kazbegi	5856				%	%
30	Kaspi	38914				%	%
32	Gori	111784				%	%
33	Kareli	47800				%	%
35	Khashuri	47396				%	%
36	Borjomi	26887				%	%
37	Akhaltsikhe	33662				%	%
38	Adigeni	15408				%	%
39	Aspindza	9761				%	%
40	Akhalkalaki	38027				%	%
41	Ninotsminda	21018				%	%
43	Oni	6991				%	%
44	Ambrolauri	11680				%	%
45	Tsageri	10446				%	%
46	Lentekhi	5766				%	%
47	Mestia	9040				%	%
48	Kharagauli	18791				%	%
49	Terjola	31928				%	%
50	Sachkhere	40016				%	%
51	Zestafoni	52701				%	%
52	Baghdadi	20614				%	%
53	Vani	23255				%	%
54	Samtredia	43437				%	%
55	Khoni	21609				%	%
56	Chiatura	40468				%	%
57	Tkibuli	19854				%	%
58	Tskaltubo	48962				%	%
59	Kutaisi	152939				%	%
60	Ozurgeti	57926				%	%
61	Lanchkhuti	27095				%	%
62	Chokhatauri	17338				%	%
63	Abasha	19574				%	%
64	Senaki	38122				%	%
65	Martvili	30700				%	%
66	Khobi	26445				%	%
67	Zugdidi	117347				%	%
68	Tsalenjikha	27504				%	%
69	Chkhorotsku	20786				%	%
70	Poti	40511				%	%
79	Batumi	157439				%	%
80	Keda	15676				%	%
81	Kobuleti	66376				%	%
82	Shuakhevi	14418				%	%
83	Khelvachauri	43401				%	%
84	Khulo	23305				%	%
Total		3,513,818				%	%
Sources: CESKO. Number of voters per 17 September 2025;71CESKO, Number of voters per electoral district

References and footnotes

• 1
  Eurasianet, 26 June 2025, Georgia’s fractured opposition wrestles with whether to contest local elections
• 2
  Civil Georgia, 9 March 2025, “Freedom Square” Movement Becomes Political Party
• 3
  Civil Georgia, 6 June 2025, Anna Dolidze’s For People Leaves Lelo-Led Strong Georgia Coalition
• 4
  IPN, 6 June 2025, Ana Dolidze and For People Party leave Strong Georgia coalition, return to independent activities
• 5
  1TV, 3 April 2025, Tsotne Koberidze, Badri Grigalashvili, Boris Chele Kurua quit ‘Girchi – More Freedom
• 6
  Netgazeti, 24 July 2025, ანა დოლიძე მუნიციპალურ არჩევნებში მონაწილეობას არ მიიღებს
• 7
  IPN, 27 June 2025, Politics 27.06.2025 / 21:49aa Aleko Elisashvili: Let’s sit down, talk, and unite around Salome Zurabishvili – let’s not be afraid to say it, let’s proclaim it. She wouldn’t be a bad candidate for mayor
• 8
  The Messenger Online, 28 May 2025, Georgian Opposition Parties Face Dilemmas
• 9
  OC Media, 30 June 2025, Georgian opposition politician Khoshtaria starts hunger strike, joined by colleague and activists
• 10
  Civil Georgia, 5 July 2025, Lelo/Strong Georgia to Run in October Local Elections, Three Senior Members Dissent
• 11
  1TV, 5 July 2025, Freedom Square criticizes Strong Georgia for participating in elections
• 12
  IPN, 5 July 2025, Elene Khoshtaria: What a 4% party like Lelo does certainly doesn’t determine Georgia’s fate. Whether they are weak or traitors – let history judge that; As for us, let’s focus on our work
• 13
  IPN, 5 July 2025, Tina Bokuchava: This is a betrayal of the common struggle, a deal with the regime in exchange for an honorable second place. Today we witnessed Lelo’s moral death — in October, we will witness their electoral death as well
• 14
  IPN, 5 July 2025, Levan Gogichaishvili: Lelo – Strong Georgia’s decision is the right one, and I support it. We need to nominate joint, neutral candidates. As for the United National Movement, I’m not interested in their opinion
• 15
  IPN, 5 July 2025, Ana Natsvlishvili has left the political council of “Lelo – For a Strong Georgia”
• 16
  Civil Georgia, 14 July 2025, Lelo, Gakharia’s For Georgia Agree to Cooperate for Local Elections
• 17
  EPDE, 22 August 2025, Election report 2025 – Municipal Elections in Georgia: Assessment of the Pre-Election Environment
• 18
  International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), 22 November 2023, Use Of Electronic Technologies In The Voting Process: Assessment Of Electronic Machines Introduced In Georgia
• 19
  European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE), 2 April 2024, New Voting Technologies In Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections
• 20
  Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 19 August 2024, სკანდალი ფირმის გარშემო, რომლის ტექნოლოგიებითაც ტარდება არჩევნები საქართველოში – ქრთამი, ფულის გათეთრება და აშშ-ის ბრალდებები
• 21
  Civil Georgia, 18 June 2025, Kobakhidze Says ODIHR Monitoring of Local Elections ‘Unnecessary’
• 22
  Civil Georgia, 9 September 2025, OSCE/ODIHR ‘Will Not Be In Position’ to Observe Georgia’s Local Elections
• 23
  Civil Georgia, 9 September 2025, CEC Hails ‘International Observers’ but Most are Obscure
• 24
  Radio Tavisupleba, 9 August 2025, ცნობილია, რომელი პარტიები მიიღებენ 2025 წლის თვითმმართველობის არჩევნებში მონაწილეობას
• 25
  1TV, 7 August 2025, People’s Power to participate in local elections in coalition with Georgian Dream
• 26
  CESKO, 18 July 2025, Sequence Numbers Of Election Subjects
• 27
  CESKO, 23 September 2025, ინფორმაცია მუნიციპალიტეტის ორგანოთა არჩევნებისთვის რეგისტრირებული პარტიული სიების, მერობისა და მაჟორიტარობის კანდიდატების შესახებ
• 28
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate lists municipalities (pdf)
• 29
  Number of municipalities the party is participating, including Tbilisi.
• 30
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Homeland, Language, Faith (pdf)
• 31
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Conservatives for Georgia (pdf)
• 32
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Our United Georgia (pdf)
• 33
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Free Georgia (pdf)
• 34
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Alliance of Patriots (pdf)
• 35
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Strong Georgia-Lelo (pdf)
• 36
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Sakartvelo (pdf)
• 37
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Green Party (pdf)
• 38
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – People’s Government (pdf)
• 39
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Gakharia for Georgia (pdf)
• 40
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Girchi (pdf)
• 41
  CESKO, 10 September 2025, Candidate list Tbilisi – Georgian Dream (pdf)
• 42
  CESKO, Election Subjects
• 43
  CESKO, 8 August 2025, Registered Election Subjects for the October 4, 2025 Municipal Elections (pdf)
• 44
  CESKO, 14 August 2025 Parties that were denied registration (pdf)
• 45
  Legislative Herald of Georgia, Election Code of Georgia, consolidated version 26 June 2024
• 46
  Note: Data was missing of Borjomi districts 36.08 and 36.09 in the available documentation prior to the elections. That is likely a total of 4-6 candidates.
• 47
  Civil Georgia, 29 September 2025, Lelo Alleges ‘Pressure, Threats, Bribery’ After Candidates Withdraw in GD’s Favor
• 48
  CESKO, 9 September 2025, Mayoral candidates
• 49
  OC Media, 23 September 2025, Opposition local elections candidate withdraws in favour of Georgian Dream
• 50
  In Bolnisi the Lelo candidate Asaf Chiragov had withdrawn, but he was still on the ballot as it was too late to change the ballot. Effectively there were 27 municipalities with only a GD candidate for mayor. In Bolnisi the invalid rate was just 5.2%, while Chiragov received only 3.3% of the vote.
• 51
  According to the district protocols.
• 52
  Local independents group: Nona Chopikashvili, Nana Khartishvili, Manana Chopikashvili, Dodo Gomiashvili, Tamari Piranishvili
• 53
  Local independents group: Gela Gelashvili, Natia Chaduneli, Giorgi Manchakov, Koba Nozadze, Irine Peradze
• 54
  Local independents group: Zaira Shengelia, Marine Darsalia, Beno Lemonjava, Osman Lemonjava, Sopiko Jagunava
• 55
  Local independents group: Nika Kalandadze, Zaza Tsiskaridze, Giuli Beridze, Lamara Sadradze, Nino Khuntsaria
• 56
  Minor gap of 110 between sum of valid and invalid votes compared to recorded total of cast votes.
• 57
  CESKO, Election Summary – Mayor election Tbilisi (in Georgian) (pdf)
• 58
  Article 162 election code.
• 59
  Total of reported party votes and invalid is 325054, which is 7 short of reported cast votes
• 60
  CESKO, Summary Results of the proportional vote for the Tbilisi City Council (in Georgian) (pdf)
• 61
  Radio Tavisupleba, 6 October 2025, „ოცნებამ“ თვითმმართველ ქალაქებში მანდატების 80%-ზე მეტი მიიღო – როგორ დაკომპლექტდება საკრებულოები (distribution of mandates)
• 62
  According to the district protocols.
• 63
  Plus one seat for an independent (district).
• 64
  Plus one seat each for “Alliance of Patriots” and “Free Georgia”.
• 65
  One district won by Lelo
• 66
  Plus one seat for Kukava’s “Free Georgia”.
• 67
  Plus one seat for an independent (district).
• 68
  Full summary of totals: Georgian Dream 1659, Strong Georgia-Lelo 59, Gakharia for Georgia 26, Conservatives for Georgia 7, Girchi 7, Free Georgia 2, Alliance of Patriots 1, Independents 2.
• 69
  CESKO, Election Summary – Persons-elected-as-members-of-the-city-council-and-mayor (in Georgian) (pdf)
• 70
  According to the district protocols.
• 71
  CESKO, Number of voters per electoral district