2024 Elections Parliament of Georgia

By Jelger Groeneveld
Last updated on 12 November 2025

The election for the 11th Convocation of the Parliament of Georgia took place on Saturday 26 October 2024. It was set to be the most important election since 2012, when Georgian Dream came to power in the first democratic and peaceful transfer of power in Georgia. It could be considered the most important election since Georgia regained its independence in 1991, due to the democratic regression under Georgian Dream.

Georgian Dream claimed victory for the fourth consecutive time, in an election that was held under a fully proportional system for the first time. The election outcome was disputed by the opposition and international observers. This triggered a deep political crisis, with the opposition boycotting parliament and western partners rejecting the election result. The US and EU member states imposed targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream representatives after protests were violently suppressed with dozens of detentions. 

Since Georgian Dream came to power in 2012 it took control over all state institutions, administrative resources and judicial structures. The European Union has spoken in recent years of ‘state capture’ in the service of the founder of Georgian Dream, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Contributing factors to the high stakes for this election were the repressive plans of the ruling party towards civil society and the pro-Western opposition and the pending break with the West.   

According to official, but disputed results Georgian Dream received 53.9% of the vote, obtaining 89 out of 150 seats in parliament. All four main opposition contenders passed the 5% threshold and cumulatively received 37.9% of the vote, good for 61 seats in parliament. The official turnout was 60.2%, the highest since 2012. Exit polls of renowned western polling agencies, such as Edison, which predicted previous election outcomes in Georgia accurately, predicted Georgian Dream received around 41% of the vote, while the four main opposition forces would have collected more than 50% of the vote. This added to suspicions of manipulations by the authorities.

The official results came under strong scrutiny from international and domestic observers, arguing a range of violations took place such as voter intimidation, coercion, vote buying, voter carousels as well as mass violations of the voting secret. Furthermore, significant statistical deviations were strong supportive indications of these manipulations, especially in rural areas. Opposition and the public protested the outcome, while the EU and US called for independent international investigations into the violations. President Salome Zurabishvili rejected the election results as rigged, and called for new elections.

1. Political context

In the years since the 2020 elections, ruling Georgian Dream has morphed its appearance from a pro-Western force into an authoritarian anti-Western power, while disrupting relations with both the United States and the European Union. Despite that, in December 2023 the country received candidate status for EU membership, which ironically fuelled Georgian Dream’s drift away from a western liberal democracy with more anti-western rhetoric, conspiracy theories and adopting repressive Russian-styled legislation regarding civil society and sexual minorities which are incompatible with EU values and norms. The adopted and announced legislation ahead of the election and the campaign rhetoric of Georgian Dream made it clear Georgia’s democracy was at stake at the ballot box.¹Jelger Groeneveld, Platform Raam, 21 October 2024, In Georgië gaan de verkiezingen over de democratie zelf

Foreign agent law aka “Russian law”

Despite promises to refrain from introducing the so-called “foreign agent” law after an aborted attempt in March 2023, Georgian Dream relaunched the law in April 2024. This law, officially called the “law on transparency on foreign influence”, targets civil society and independent media and labels them as “foreign agent” if they receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad, similar to Russian legislation. Hence it was dubbed “Russian law” by opponents. Despite mass protests and strong European objections, warning the “foreign agent” legislation is not compatible with EU values and Georgia’s EU accession path, the law was adopted in May 2024 by a majority of 84 MPs from Georgian Dream and its spin-off People’s Power.²Civil Georgia, 28 May 2024, Breaking: Parliament Overrides President’s Veto on Foreign Agents Law, Adopts the Agents’ Law

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The adoption triggered the US and EU to review their relations with Georgia. The EU halted Georgia’s accession process and the EU and US froze funding for government programs,³Radio Free Europe, 9 July 2024, EU Halts Georgia’s Accession, Freezes Financial Assistance⁴US Department of State, 31 July 2024, United States to Pause Assistance to the Government of Georgia as well as NATO exercises in Georgia.⁵US Department of Defense, 5 July 2024, Postponement of Exercise Noble Partner Announcement Various individual EU member states, such as Germany and Denmark, also indicated to review their relations with Georgia and the freezing of financial support of government programs.⁶Civil Georgia, 10 July 2024, Ambassador: Germany Stops New Financing, Pulls out from Drills, Keeps Student Visas⁷Civil Georgia, 30 July 2024, Denmark Fully Reviews Aid to Georgia, “Will Suspend Some Planned Activities and New Programming Support”

The Georgian government announced on 30 July it would be ready to enact the law beginning 1 August 2024, after which date applicable organizations would be required to register as foreign agent. Failing to do so could result in fines of 25,000 Georgian lari (~€ 8500 or US$ 9200) and forced registration by the authorities.⁸Civil Georgia, 30 July 2024, Justice Minister Decrees Financial Reporting Department to Implement the Agents’ Law The announcement of the enactment was followed by the US and Denmark to freeze aid programs with the Georgian government. Hundreds of Georgian civil society organizations announced earlier they won’t register voluntarily.

On top of the regressive “foreign agent” legislation, Georgian Dream adopted a package of anti-LGBTI legislation under the name of “protection of family values” ahead of the elections, which bans so-called “LGBTI-propaganda” and gatherings, bans the adoption of children by same-sex couples, bans transgender rights, and puts a ban on changing gender in official documents.⁹Civil Georgia, 17 September 2024, Parliament Adopts Anti-LGBT Legislation in Third Hearing

Georgian Charter

On Independence Day 26 May, president Salome Zurabishvili announced the “Georgian Charter”, a roadmap for resolving the political crisis and returning to the path of EU integration.¹⁰Civil Georgia, 26 May 2024, Georgian Charter: President Proposes Unified Goals for Short-Term Parliament, Technical Government The charter proposed a non-partisan technical government to be formed after the elections on 26 October, which would withdraw and abolish any law that damages the European path, such as the “foreign agent law”, the (tax) law on repatriation of offshore assets, the law on surveillance, and several other laws.

Also, reforms that are required to proceed towards opening the EU accession negotiations would have to be implemented. Upon completion, the technical government would schedule early elections in autumn 2025. A week after the announcement of the Georgian Charter, 17 opposition parties and 5 independent opposition MPs signed it.¹¹Civil Georgia, 3 June 2024, Opposition Parties Sign Georgian Charter On 23 September 2024, Gakharia’s For Georgia joined the Charter.¹²Civil Georgia, 23 September 2024, Gakharia – For Georgia Signs President’s “Georgian Charter”

2. Timeline

The timeline of political and party updates in the five months leading up to the election day is stored in a separate page.

3. Results

The finalized protocol of the election results was signed on 16 November 2024. The table below shows the official results released by the Central Election Commission (CESKO), ordered by number of votes (full table in Appendix 1). Georgian Dream was declared the winner with 53.93% of the votes, good for 89 of the 150 seats in parliament. The turnout was established at 60.2%. While according to the official results, the ruling Georgian Dream was the clear winner domestically, the vote abroad showed a different picture.

There were a total of 34,296 valid votes abroad, of which only 13.5% was for the ruling Georgian Dream at the fourth place. Winner in the vote abroad was Coalition for Change (33.3%), followed by UNM (19.9%), Strong Georgia (14.9%) and For Georgia (9.0%). The average turnout in the 67 precincts abroad was 36.0%, double compared to 2020.

3.1 Exit polls

The various exit polls order by pro-government and opposition leaning media showed divergent pictures of the election outcome – as happened in 2020 – especially regarding the performance of the ruling party Georgian Dream. The exit poll conducted by GORBI for pro-government Imedi TV claimed Georgian Dream was in the lead with 56% of the vote, followed by Coalition for Georgia as second (12.2%), then UNM (11.6%), Strong Georgia (7.0%) and For Georgia at 4.8%, not enough to pass the threshold.

Exit polls for opposition leaning channels conducted by HarrisX (for Mtavari Arkhi) and Edison (for Formula TV) showed 41-42% for Georgian Dream, with a combined majority of 52% for the four main opposition parties.²³Civil Georgia, 26 October 2024, Exit Polls Show Conflicting Results as Polls Close According to Edison both Coalition for Change and UNM would have gotten 16.7%, Strong Georgia 10.3% and For Georgia 8.2%. This would be enough for the four opposition forces to form a parliamentary majority of 83 seats, while Georgian Dream would get 67 seats with this result.²⁴Edison, 26 October 2024, Edison Research Exit Poll projects clear victory for opposition parties in Republic of Georgia Parliamentary Elections The opposition and ruling party claimed victory based on the respective exit polls.²⁵Civil Georgia, 26 October 2024, GD, Opposition Both Celebrate Victory

Later in the evening of 26 October, the preliminary official results came in based on the electronically counted ballots, showing Georgian Dream received 53% of the vote share.²⁶Civil Georgia, 26 October 2024, Official Preliminary Results: Georgian Dream Leads with 52.99% The major discrepancy between the official count and both Edison and HarrisX exit polls added to concerns of election manipulation. Edison exit polls held during Georgian elections since 2012 predicted the outcome accurately within the margin of error.

Edison marked the large (and for them unusual) discrepancy between their exit poll and the official results, noting in a statement this suggests vote manipulation: “The 13-point difference between Edison’s estimate and the official result of 54% for Georgian Dream cannot be explained by normal variation alone and suggests local-level manipulation of the vote”. Edison reviewed their data and found that the “deviation from statistically expected results was widespread but most pronounced at specific polling locations in rural areas. These locations are likely to have had the most significant vote manipulation at the polling location level”.²⁷Edison, 1 November 2024, Edison Research 2024 Republic of Georgia Exit Poll Edison also noted that their 12 representative surveys in Georgia throughout 2023 and 2024 suggested Georgian Dream would under-perform their 2020 vote by 10 percent, but instead exceeded it with 6 percent.

HarrisX re-weighed their initial exit poll, corrected for the final turnout numbers as well as age and gender balance. This correction gave Georgian Dream a slight advantage (44.4%, compared to the initial 42%), but the large disparity with the official results remained. HarrisX did the survey in 27 different districts throughout Georgia, covering 125 polling stations with a recorded response from 12,007 voters. In a further analysis of all data, including the official data, revealed “statistically unexplainable data discrepancies” between their exit poll results and official results, which “cannot be explained by statistical variance, suggesting potential voting irregularities”.²⁸HarrisX, 31 October 2024, BREAKING: HarrisX Releases Final Georgia 2024 Exit Poll Analysis

3.2 Turnout

The nationwide turnout was initially established at 58.9%, nearly three percent higher than the previous elections in 2020, but slightly lower than the 2012 elections which brought Georgian Dream to power.²⁹Civil Georgia, 26 October 2024, Polls Close with 58,94% Turnout. According to the final protocol the turnout was 60.2%. Per election district the turnout varied between 43.7 and 76.1%, with the highest turnout in the western part of the country.

3.3 Regional distribution

While Georgian Dream was by far the largest party in every election district, the support for the individual opposition parties varied in the regions. Overall, Coalition for Change finished as second, but that was mostly carried by capital Tbilisi and major cities like Rustavi, Kutaisi and Poti. In most election districts, UNM received the 2nd largest vote share. In Tbilisi, Strong Georgia was the third largest, followed by For Georgia, while UNM was the least supported of the main opposition parties in the capital.

The vote for Georgian Dream per election district varied between 38% in Vake (Tbilisi) to 88% in Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda in the southern Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Also in Ivanishvili’s home district Sachkhere, support for Georgian Dream was excessively high at 84%. The party’s support was the lowest in the big cities, Tbilisi (42%), Rustavi (41%), Kutaisi (47%) and Batumi (49%). The extremely high support for Georgian Dream in some regions, far above the national average of 54% in the official results, added to suspicions of manipulations in those areas. In various local precincts in these areas the official results showed up to 98% votes for GD.

UNM had relatively strong support in Kakheti, Adjara and parts of Samegrelo. Strong Georgia had their best scores in Tbilisi, but was simply overtaken by Coalition for Change. But it also had relatively good performance in the sparsely populated mountain regions. Gakharia for Georgia did not manage to finish second in any district, but it had double digit scores in the cities Tbilisi, Batumi, Rustavi, and most of the Samegrelo region.

3.4 Votes abroad

The diaspora turnout was 36.0 percent. The 34.530 voters abroad voted in large majority for the main pro-western opposition groups (78.9%), while Georgian Dream received only 11.5% abroad.

4. Election observation

The Georgian government invited the OSCE ODIHR for an election observation mission. After a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) performed in May 2024, the ODIHR recommended to send 28 long term observers (LTO) for a prolonged pre-election observation and 350 short term observers (STO) for election day. Georgian civil society organizations informed the NAM mission about the negative impact of the “foreign agent” law on the observation missions that CSOs are legally allowed to perform.³⁰OSCE ODIHR, 24 June 2024, Needs Assessment Mission Report 20-24 May 2024 (pdf) According to the CSOs, the “foreign agent” law will result in labelling CSOs as “representing the interests of foreign powers” and create an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility, which will negatively impact their ability to operate and to deploy observation activities.

Starting 19 July 2024, the International Republican Institute (IRI) deployed 20 long term observers, “to cover municipalities and electoral districts across the country”.³¹IRI, 18 July 2024, Observation Mission Ahead of Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections The National Democratic Institute (NDI) arrived in the week of 22 July 2024 in Tbilisi with a long term mission of five plus additional Georgia based staff.³²Civil Georgia, 24 July 2024, NDI, IRI Launch Long-term Election Observation Missions

5. Aftermath

Shortly after the election results were released, the opposition organized protests in Tbilisi.³³France24, 28 October 2024, Protests erupt in Georgia after contested vote as Hungary’s Orban visits A string of marches throughout the city took place, while mass protests were organized on a frequent basis at parliament well into November.³⁴Radio Free Europe, 4 November 2024, Thousands Protest Georgia’s ‘Stolen Election’ In Tbilisi³⁵Associated Press, 12 November 2024, Thousands rally outside Georgian parliament to demand a new election towards European integration Election watchdogs and opposition parties submitted legal cases at the courts to challenge the election results. Immediately after the elections, opposition and civil society gathered evidence of manipulations to corroborate their claims. They also performed PVT (Parallel Vote Tabulation) on election night to secure data from the local precincts.

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5.1 Legal challenges

The largest legal case was the breach of vote secrecy due to the way the ballot had to be submitted into the electronic counting machine (the scanner). This in combination with strong markers used for the vote on the ballot, caused the dot to be pressed through to the back side of the ballot, allowing for any witness to guess the vote. Since precinct election commission members were assisting voters with the submission of the ballot in the scanner, the vote was exposed to them in many cases, which was reported by international and local observers.

The election watchdog “My Vote” tried to have all election results of the precincts with this electronic technology to be annulled, effectively rendering the elections as a whole invalid. Both Kutaisi and Tbilisi Courts of Appeal did not agree with this.³⁶Civil Georgia, 7 November 2024, Tbilisi Court of Appeals Rejects Alleged Breach of Ballot Secrecy, Upholding Official Results The Tetritskaro district court ruled the results of 30 precincts to be annulled, creating hope among the opposition, but the decision was overruled by the higher Tbilisi court.³⁷Ibid. President Zurbaishvili appealed to the Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality of the elections, based on violation of the principles of vote secrecy and universal suffrage.³⁸Civil Georgia, 17 November 2024, President Zurabishvili Challenges the Constitutionality of Elections in Court The court rejected the demand to cancel the election results two weeks later.³⁹Civil Georgia, 3 December 2024, Breaking: Constitutional Court Rejects Appeals by President and Opposition MPs

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While the protests were ongoing, the opposition gathered further evidence of the election manipulations, and experts analyzed the data and determined major deviations within the statistical curves, such as high turnouts in combination with excessively high amount of Georgian Dream votes of more than 90% in precincts in rural districts.

5.2 Boycott of parliament

The opposition parties decided to boycott parliament, to have their mandates terminated and withdraw their party lists from the registration. The latter would prevent party-list candidates to be acknowledged as MP once the mandates from the elected MPs would be terminated. In this way, these parliament seats would remain empty. Opposition coalitions Unity, Coalition for Change and Strong Georgia officially applied for termination of their parliamentary mandates in mid-November.⁴⁰Civil Georgia, 12 November 2024, Coalition for Change, Unity-UNM Officially Renounce Their MP Mandates⁴¹Civil Georgia, 15 November 2024, Strong Georgia Renounces MP Mandates The parties also committed to withdraw their party lists at the end of November, a day after the inauguration of parliament.⁴²Civil Georgia, 26 November 2024, Unity-UNM Appeals to CEC to Revoke its Party List Gakharia for Georgia said they would boycott parliament, but would chose their own moment to decide on formal termination of parliamentary powers and annulment of the party-list.⁴³IPN, 26 November 2024, Giorgi Gakharia: No one will pressure us to cancel the lists – we will not ask either the National Movement or Ivanishvili and his party, we will leave the mandates when and in such a form as we deem necessary

After Christmas recess, Chairman of the Committee on Procedural Issues and Rules of Parliament Davit Makitashvili said he could not specify whether the termination of opposition mandates as requested will be on the agenda at the opening of the Spring session of parliament. According to him “parliament will discuss the aforementioned issue when it deems it necessary”,⁴⁴IPN, 14 January 2025დავით მათიკაშვილი – ოპოზიციონერი დეპუტატებისთვის მანდატის შეწყვეტის საკითხზე პარლამენტი მაშინ იმსჯელებს, როცა საჭიროდ ჩათვლის suggesting the ruling power would keep this floating in the air as bargaining chip with the opposition. Also, delaying the removal of the opposition from parliament – even upon their own free will – could serve as proof to the international arena Georgian Dream does not actively seek a one-party parliament. The legislation on termination of mandates stipulates however that the request should be concluded within 15 days by the procedural committee and the request should be put on the agenda for the first plenary session after that. This suggests the procedure has been violated in this case.

5.3 Inauguration of Parliament

On 16 November 2024, the central election commission CESKO signed the final protocols, making the results definite. This also triggered the legal deadline for the inaugural session of the new parliament, to be called by the president and to be performed within 10 days. President Zurabishvili refused to call this session as she denounced the election results as rigged, which in her opinion undermined the legitimacy of parliament. She also had two cases pending at the Constitutional Court, effectively demanding the election results to be cancelled.

Georgian Dream leaders ignored this and the lack of the presidential call for the opening session. They went ahead with convening parliament anyways on Monday 25 November. The 88 Georgian Dream MPs present rubber stamped all 150 mandates of the elected MPs, including those of the opposition, which boycotted the session. According to Georgian constitutional experts this session was in violation of the constitution, calling the parliament illegal. Incumbent Shalva Papuashvili was extended as parliament speaker and chair.

Also, Georgian Dream called the presidential election for 14 December 2024 with an inauguration date on 29 December 2024. This was against legal procedures and timespans. On 27 November 2024, Bidzina Ivanishvili presented Mikheil Kavelashvili as presidential nominee, a former soccer player and an MP elected on the list of Georgian Dream, but part of the radical anti-western, ultra-conservative People Power party, a proxy spin-off from Georgian Dream. On 28 November 2024 the self-inaugurated parliament agreed to the cabinet led by incumbent prime minister Irakli Kobakhidze.

With the above steps, Georgian Dream effectively performed an unconstitutional power grab, a coup.

5.4 Freezing EU accession: escalation of protests

On 28 November 2024, after a European Parliament resolution denouncing the Georgian elections and calling for new elections to take place, PM Kobakhidze said the Georgian government would freeze the EU accession process until the end of 2028 and would refuse and EU assistance until that time. Shortly after the election, the EU had already said to freeze funding and the accession process for the time being, until Georgia would revert legislation that stood in the way, such as the so-called “foreign agent” law. Immediately after Kobakhidzes announcement, spontaneous protests broke out throughout Georgia, lasting for months.

Thousands civil servants throughout many government institutions denounced the step in open letters as anti-constitutional, followed by dozens of large businesses who said this would harm the business climate and Georgia’s national interests. The protests were repeatedly violently repressed, leading to hundreds arrested and dozens injured, including journalists. The police repression was accompanied with so-called ‘titushki’ gangs beating up protesters in vulnerable spots.

On 10 December 2024, eight Georgian Dream MPs had their mandates terminated. Honorary chair Bidzina Ivanishvili and party chair Irakli Gharibashvili relinquished their mandates, stating their party functions, while Mikheil Kavelashvili had to give up his mandate as presidential nominee. The other five MPs became member of the cabinet: Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Minister of Foreign Affairs Maka Bochorishvili, Minister of Justice Anri Okhanashvili, Minister of Environmental Protection and Agriculture Davit Songulashvili and Deputy Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development Mariam Kvrivishvili.⁴⁵IPN, 10 December 2024, ბიძინა ივანიშვილს, ირაკლი ღარიბაშვილს, მიხეილ ყაველაშვილს, ირაკლი კობახიძეს, მაკა ბოჭორიშვილს, ანრი ოხანაშვილს, დავით სონღულაშვილსა და მარიამ ქვრივიშვილს დეპუტატის უფლებამოსილება შეუწყდათ

On the same day, the mandates eight new MPs from the Georgian Dream party list were confirmed by parliament. The eight were the next ones on the party list: Levan Machavariani, Archil Gorduladze, Salome Jinjolava, Tornike Berekashvili, Tornike Cheishvili, Paata Salia, Giorgi Guguchia, Irakli Cheishvili.⁴⁶Netgazeti, 10 December 2024, პაატა სალია, არჩილ გორდულაძე და სხვები – „ოცნებამ“ 8 ახალი დეპუტატის უფლებამოსილება ცნო Salome Kurasbediani, number 92 on the list and third next one, was skipped for unknown reasons. Likely she declined. Newly recognized MP Paata Salia is co-owner of the Rustavi2 channel and whas its director. Under his directorship the channel turned into a government friendly station after the lengthy legal ownership battle in the years 2015-2019.⁴⁷Radio Free Europe RFE/RL, 22 August 2019, More Rustavi-2 TV Journalists Quit After New Owner Fires Colleagues Of the newly recognized MPs, only Levan Machavariani was an MP in the previous term, since April 2024.

5.5 Termination of Mandates

On 5 February 2025, the Committee on Procedural Issues and Rules of the parliament supported the termination requests of the mandates of all 49 MPs of Unity, Coalition for Change and Strong Georgia, which they officially requested in November 2024.⁴⁸IPN, 5 February 2025, Committee on Procedural Issues supports termination of parliamentary mandates of 49 MPs A few hours later all 49 mandates were officially terminated by the plenary session of parliament,⁴⁹IPN, 5 February 2025, 49 ოპოზიციონერ დეპუტატს სადეპუტატო უფლებამოსილება შეუწყდა – 150-წევრიანი პარლამენტი 101-წევრიანი გახდა resulting in a 101-member parliament.

Girchi-More Freedom

On 3 April 2025, three members of Girchi-More Freedom, Tsotne Koberidze, Boris Kurua and Badri Grigalashvili, announced they would leave the party. Koberidze and Kurua were co-founders of the party and were elected in parliament via the Coalition for Change party list, while Grigalashvili stood electable on #24. They cited the “need for change”.⁵⁰Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 3 April 2025, ცოტნე კობერიძემ და ბორის (ჩელე) ყურუამ ზურა ჯაფარიძის „გირჩი – მეტი თავისუფლება“ დატოვეს⁵¹IPN, 3 April 2025, Badri Grigalashvili is also leaving the party “Girchi – More Freedom” Koberidze said the party made many mistakes. “I think that what we are doing is nothing new – everything is the same. I don’t believe that change can be achieved by staying the same”.

Criticizing the role of Salome Zurabishvili, Koberidze said he does “not believe in the victory formula whose main weapon is Salome Zurabishvili – the president brought in by Bidzina Ivanishvili with the worst elections”. With that he referred to the 2018 presidential election when Zurabishvili, as independent, was supported by Georgian Dream. For the first time a 2nd round was required in a Georgian presidential election. It is alleged the 2nd round was only narrowly won by Zurabishvili through manipulations of the outcome.

Gakharia for Georgia

Since February 2025, Georgian Dream leaders insisted “it would be the best option for the rehabilitation of our democratic system for [“Gakharia for Georgia”] and the last representatives of the “National Movement” to lose their mandates in the Georgian parliament – there is no place for any foreign agent in the Georgian parliament.“⁵²IPN, 6 February 2025, Irakli Kobakhidze: The best option would be for Gakharia’s party and the last representatives of the “National Movement” to lose their mandates – there is no place for any foreign agent in the parliament At the end of May 2025, Georgian Dream faction leader Mdinaradze hinted the termination of Gakharia’s mandates was looming.⁵³OC Media, 29 May 2025, Georgian Dream will revoke the mandates of Gakharia’s MPs from the opposition For Georgia party

Four weeks later, on 26 June 2025, the parliamentary Committee on Procedural Issues and Rules announced they would prepare the termination of all twelve mandates of Gakharia For Georgia, on the grounds of “unjustified absence from sessions”.⁵⁴IPN, 30 June 2025, Parliamentary Committee on Procedural Issues and Rules to discuss early termination of powers of members of Gakharia for Georgia party on June 30 Deputy chair or parliament Nino Tsilosani denied the aim was to lift immunity for persecution in absentia, while Gakharia remained abroad. She said Gakharia for Georgia deliberately did this themselves by staying away.⁵⁵IPN, 26 June 2025, Nino Tsilosani – Giorgi Gakharia and his party members are deliberately revoking immunity and mandate On 2 July 2025, parliament terminated the mandates of all twelve MPs of Gakharia For Georgia.⁵⁶Civil Georgia, 2 July 2025, Georgian Dream Parliament Terminates 12 Gakharia Party Mandates The party was also stripped of state funding for the next six months starting with the beginning of the autumn session, as penalty for their absence in the previous session.

As the party didn’t have their list cancelled, the next twelve on the list can be appointed, unless they personally revoke their right. This would create an opportunity for Georgian Dream to coerce the replacements on the list into joining their ranks or at least to participate in the parliamentary process (ie, not boycott) and thus become part of legitimizing the “multi-party” parliament.

At the end of summer recess, parliament announced the recognition of the parliamentary mandates of twelve replacements of Gakharia for Georgia would be on the agenda during the first plenary session of the autumn session.⁵⁷IPN, 28 August 2025, Parliament to decide next week on recognizing the powers of replacement deputies for 12 terminated members of the “Gakharia for Georgia” party Given the announcement of the twelve replacements by name, it is known Elguja Khokrishvili (#17), Kakha Nuralidze (#19), Vakhtang Pachulia (#26) and Erekle Dumbadze (#27) renounced their right to their mandate (see Appendix 2, second table replacements). The mandates of the replacements were recognized by parliament on 2 September 2025.

A week later, Imedi TV claimed eight of these new MPs appealed to parliament chair Papuashvili to allow them to enter parliament after they ceased activities incompatible with being an MP. In a statement in response, leader Giorgi Gakharia said the party remains “committed to a political boycott!” and that “the situation regarding mandates, which has already been discussed many times, has not changed!”⁵⁸Radio Tavisupleba, 9 September 2025, გახარიას პარტიაში აცხადებენ, რომ “პოლიტიკური ბოიკოტის რეჟიმში რჩებიან”

On 20 October 2025, two weeks after the disastrous local elections, the replacement MP Giorgi Sharashidze made a statement announcing the twelve MPs would stop the party’s boycott and resume parliamentary work. He defended the step by saying the collective opposition boycott of a year failed to achieve its goals and that the boycott and abolition of parliamentary mandates was a mistake, that “led to the current situation”.⁵⁹IPN, 20 October 2025, Gakharia for Georgia party stops boycott, enters parliament

Sharashidze: ”Unfortunately, we must admit that this form of political protest could not stop the evil machine of the Dream and could not prevent damaging decisions for the country by the de facto government, such as suspending Georgia’s European integration process, adopting anti-democratic and human rights-violating laws, strengthening the autocratic regime, violence against peaceful citizens, stealing free and fair elections, and many other criminal, anti-national, and anti-state actions.”

On Monday 27 October 2025, freshly appointed MP Rusudan Tevzadze for Gakharia for Georgia announced her resignation from her parliamentary mandate and leaving the party. Tevzadze was member of the political council of the party since the beginning in 2021. She explicitly stated her decision is not against the party, but for the future of the country.⁶⁰IPN, 27 October 2025, Rusudan Tevzadze announces she is renouncing her parliamentary mandate and leaving the “Gakharia for Georgia” party

5.6 Creation of pseudo-opposition

On 13 December 2024, People’s Power MP Guram Macharashvili announced the party would leave the parliamentary majority of Georgian Dream to go into “opposition”. With this step the party would “lay the foundation for the existence of a healthy opposition in Georgia”, Macharashvili said.⁶¹IPN, 13 December 2024, People’s Power leaves the parliamentary majority and joins the opposition This is in line with the rhetoric and the election promise of Georgian Dream to cleanse the opposition by banning “UNM and its satellites” in order to create a “healthy democratic system”.⁶²Imedi, 20 August 2024, Ruling Georgian Dream party clarifies why it needs to secure constitutional majority in upcoming parliamentary elections People’s Power leader Sozar Subari was appointed deputy speaker of Parliament on behalf of the “parliamentary minority”, the opposition.

In this way People’s Power acts as the radical yet accepted pseudo-opposition, similarly to Russia’s managed political playing field, in which serious challengers have been outcast or banned. Georgian Dream has envisioned such a system in its election campaign. Since the pro-Western opposition parties decided to terminate their parliamentary mandates, the parliament was effectively left without an opposition. Installing People’s Power as pseudo-opposition was a transparent attempt by Georgian Dream to remove the image of a “one-party parliament”.

Obviously this was just window dressing. Notably, presidential candidate Mikheil Kavelashvili, a founding member of People’s Power, was nominated by Georgian Dream in November 2024, which only contributed to the shambolic creation of a “healthy opposition”. On top of that, People’s Power MP Irakli Beraia was appointed deputy minister of Justice in January 2025 and took place in the government.⁶³IPN, 13 January 2025, Irakli Beraia has been appointed as Deputy Minister of Justice This was short lived, as Beraia was appointed head of the Investigative Service of the Ministry of Finance a few months later during a minor cabinet reshuffle.⁶⁴Civil Georgia, 3 April 2025, Irakli Beraia Appointed as Head of Finance Ministry’s Investigative Service

The process of creating a “healthy” (pseudo-)opposition continued in February 2025.  On the day parliament terminated the mandates of 49 opposition MPs (see above), the recipe was repeated by creating a second pseudo-opposition faction, which originated from Georgian Dream. Three GD MPs left the parliamentary majority on 5 February 2025 to form the parliamentary minority group “European Socialists” and register it as opposition.⁶⁵Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 5 February 2025, “ქართულ ოცნებას” სამი “ოპოზიციონერი” გამოეყო MPs Ilia Injia, Varlam Liparteliani and Nika Elisashvili confirmed in a declaration this step had everything to do with the election promise of Georgian Dream to “establish a healthy political system”:

“A healthy democratic system can never be established without a healthy opposition. I am confident that our activities will play an important role in establishing political systems oriented towards the development of the country” (IIlia Injia).

That this was just a move for pseudo-opposition was confirmed on 23 June 2025 when Liparteliani moved back to Georgian Dream, to be replaced in the European Socialists with GD MP Vladimer (Lado) Bozhadze. The latter became the faction leader.⁶⁶IPN, 23 June 2025, პარლამენტში შექმნილი პოლიტიკური ჯგუფის „ევროპელი სოციალისტების“ შემადგენლობაში ცვლილებები განხორციელდა

5.7 Legitimacy

Protests against the legitimacy of parliament and government continued throughout Georgia in December 2024 and January 2025. After the election on 14 December 2024 of Mikheil Kavelashvili as president by the new electoral college and his installation on 29 December 2024 as successor to Salome Zurabishvili, his legitimacy was also challenged by the Georgian opposition as well as western politicians.⁶⁷Civil Georgia, 16 December 2024, International Reactions to Kavelashvili’s Election⁶⁸Civil Georgia, International Reactions to Inauguration of Mikheil Kavelashvili as GD’s President-Elect, 30 December 2024 Zurabishvili claimed she was the only legitimate president of Georgia.⁶⁹The Guardian, 29 December 2024, Georgia’s pro-west president says she remains ‘only legitimate president’ as new leader sworn in

The recognition of the delegation of Georgian Dream to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) was challenged by various pan-European political groups, specifically the centre-right European Peoples Party (EPP) and liberal ALDE.⁷⁰IPN, 24 January 2024, Givi Mikanadze: Next week, at the PACE winter session, there will be an attempt to limit the authority of the delegation of the newly elected Parliament of Georgia – the Deep State does not accept the existence of a peace-oriented government in Georgia The new delegation is headed by Georgian Dream prominent and deputy speaker of parliament Tea Tsulukiani. Givi Mikanadze, Mariam Lashkhi and Eka Sepashvili are the main members of the delegation, with reserve members Rati Ionatamishvili, Levan Machavariani and Zviad Shalamberidze. Georgian Dream accused the imaginary “Deep State” being behind this, saying it “does not accept the existence of a peace-oriented government in Georgia”.

5.8 Tsulukiani Commission

On 3 February, ahead of the opening of the Spring session of parliament, Georgian Dream initiated the “Temporary Investigative Commission to Investigate the Activities of the Regime and Its Political Officials in 2003-2012”, informally known as the Tsulukiani Commission. This commission had an initial duration of three months and could be extended to a maximum of six months to “investigate” the Saakashvili-led UNM government.⁷¹IPN, 3 February 2025, პარლამენტში “2003-2012 წლებში მოქმედი რეჟიმის და რეჟიმის პოლიტიკური თანამდებობის პირების საქმიანობის შემსწავლელი დროებითი საგამოძიებო კომისიის” შექმნის პროექტი ინიცირებულია It was tasked to produce a report with findings to forward to the prosecutors office for further legal action if required. The initiative had to be placed in the context of the election promise of Georgian Dream to “make the political system in Georgia healthy” (by removing UNM and “all its proxies”).

The explanatory note by Georgian Dream said “there is a radical opposition operating in Georgia, which committed many crimes against the Georgian state and people during its time in power from 2003 to 2012. Since 2012, this political force has openly opposed Georgia’s national interests and has created a decisive obstacle to the establishment of a healthy political system in Georgia [….] The underestimation of the systemic crimes committed by the regime and its political officials in 2003-2012 is a problem that has hindered the formation of a healthy political system in Georgia, contributed to the creation of a polarized political environment, and ultimately threatened Georgia’s state security and sovereignty”.

The commission started on 13 February 2025 and counted eight MPs divided over “majority” (5) and “minority” (3). On behalf of Georgian Dream, Tea Tsulukiani, Aleksandre Tabatadze, Tengiz Sharmanashvili, Aluda Ghudushauri and Paata Salia were nominated. On behalf of the so-called “opposition”, People’s Power leader Sozar Subari, Guram Macharashvili (PP) and Ilia Injia (European Socialists faction) were nominated. These two groups originated from the Georgian Dream ranks and took up the minority role in parliament as pseudo-opposition (see above at 5.5). Since Gakharia for Georgia was formally still part of parliament, two positions were allocated to them but they remained vacant as the party did not participate in any parliamentary activity.⁷²IPN, 10 February 2025, 2003-2012 წლებში მოქმედი რეჟიმისა და მისი პოლიტიკური თანამდებობის პირების საქმიანობის შემსწავლელი დროებითი საგამოძიებო კომისიის პერსონალური შემადგენლობა ცნობილია⁷³IPN, 13 February 2025, 2003-2012 წლებში მოქმედი რეჟიმისა და მისი პოლიტიკური თანამდებობის პირების საქმიანობის შემსწავლელი“ დროებითი საგამოძიებო კომისია დღეს პირველ სხდომას გამართავს

During the first month of hearings, various subjects passed by: the prison abuse, appropriation of businesses and the detention of business owners, as well as the years leading up to the 2008 war. By the end of March, the committee summoned both Badri Japaridze and Mamuka Khazaradze, leaders of Lelo for Georgia/Strong Georgia, in relation to their alleged role in business confiscation activities during the Saakashvili-era, as stakeholders in the TBC Bank. Both men refused to appear in front to the commission and their refusal was forwarded to the prosecution. Committee chair Tsulukiani warned the offense is criminally punishable with up to a year prison sentence.⁷⁴OC Media, 26 March 2025, Georgian prosecutors launch investigation into opposition leader Mamuka Khazaradze

On 14 April 2025, the mandate of the commission was expanded to include the years from 2012 to present, while its deadline was extended with a month.⁷⁵Civil Georgia, 14 April 2025, GD to Appeal to Constitutional Court to Ban Opposition Parties After Local Elections On the same day it became obvious why this was done, as Giorgi Gakharia, was questioned for six hours in the commission on matters unrelated to the Saakashvili-era, but Gakharia’s time as interior minister in 2019. Unlike other opposition members, he decided to appear in front of the commission “to do everything, wherever and whenever I can, to state my different opinions”. Gakharia was questioned on his role as interior minister in the dispersal of the 20 June 2019 protests, the “Gavrilov Night”, in which hundreds were injured. He denied he ordered the police to fire rubber bullets, explaining he had in fact ordered to stop the use once he learned about it, instructing they should only be used as least resort.⁷⁶Civil Georgia, 14 April 2025, Gakharia Appears Before GD Parliamentary Investigative Commission

The interview also delved into the Chorchana crisis, the construction of a Georgian police post at the occupation line with South Ossetia in August 2019, as result of which Georgia lost control of 5km2 territory.⁷⁷Eastwatch, Jelger Groeneveld, 2019-, Territorial dispute Chorchana-Tsnelisi over old and “fake” maps The commission accused Gakharia of not informing the government, the state security service nor the EUMM mission. Gakharia said in response he in fact coordinated the construction of the police post with the EUMM and the government. In June 2025 Gakharia was summoned for the second time in the commission, after former head of the security service Vakhtang Gomelauri said he was not consulted and would have advised against the police post at Chorchana. He had suggested that thanks to his intervention at the time a war was averted.⁷⁸Sakartvelos Ambebi, 14 June 2025, Gomelauri on Chorchana Checkpoint: We were informed post-factum. It was not coordinated Opposition leaders assessed the commission’s focus on Gakharia and the Chorchana crisis was designed to coerce him into participation in the local elections in October 2025, or else face prison time.⁷⁹Civil Georgia, Gakharia in Prosecution Crosshairs Over 2019 Chorchana Tensions, 14 April 2025

On 27 May 2025 the term of the commission was again extended for a month, until 5 July 2025,⁸⁰Civil Georgia, 27 May 2025, GD Parliament Extends Mandate of UNM Investigative Commission to be extended for one more time on 25 June 2025 till 5 August 2025, its legal determined maximum term. On 4 August 2025, the Commission wrapped up by announcing it created a 430 page report to be published, discussed and adopted by Parliament in early September.⁸¹Civil Georgia, Tsulukiani’s Investigative Commission Wraps Up, Report Expected in September, 4 August 2025 Commission chair Tsulukiani said the report draws on 46 commission sessions, testimony from 139 witnesses, and a total of 775 testimonies. The commission also reviewed national and international court rulings and reports from international organizations, it deemed applicable, according to Tsulukiani.

Shortly after the local elections of 4 October 2025 Georgian Dream initiated lawsuits that were drafted from the findings of the Tsulukiani commission. First a lawsuit was filed at the Constitutional Court to ban three opposition parties (see paragraph 5.10), to be followed two weeks later by a lawsuit against Giorgi Gakharia for his role in the dismissal of the protests during the “Gavrilov Night” and the so-called Chorchana crisis.⁸²Civil Georgia, 12 November 2025, Ex-PM Gakharia Charged in Absentia Over ‘Gavrilov’s Night,’ Chorchana Tensions At that moment he was in exile in Germany, but the authorities said they would seek pre-trial detention. The charges amounted to up to 13 years prison.

5.9 Imprisonment of opposition leaders

From mid-May, authorities started to arrest and sentence those who refused to appear in front of the Commission, which were mostly opposition leaders. Former defence minister Irakli Okruashvili was the first to be arrested and sentenced to pre-trial detention, after he refused to pay his bail and the 30-day deadline expired.⁸³Civil Georgia, 14 May 2025, Court Sends Former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili to Pre-trial Detention In subsequent weeks, Zurab Japaridze (Girch-More Freedom), Nika Melia (Akhali) and Nika Gvaramia (Akhali) of the Coalition for Change were also arrested and put in pre-trial detention for the same.⁸⁴Civil Georgia, 29 May 2025, Opposition Leader Nika Melia Detained⁸⁵Civil Georgia, 13 June 2025, Court Sends Third Opposition Leader, Nika Gvaramia, to Detention Over Boycotting GD Commission Other opposition leaders who had refused to appear, paid their bail.

By the end of June, the court started to sentence them one by one, with an imprisonment of variably seven or eight months and a bar on holding public office for two years. On 23 June 2025, Zurab Japaridze was the first to be sentenced for seven months.⁸⁶Civil Georgia, 23 June 2025, Zurab Japaridze Sentenced to Seven Months in Jail in First Verdict for Defying GD Commission On the same day both Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze received eight months. Both men were arrested at the Lelo party office, where they were waiting their court ruling.⁸⁷Civil Georgia, 23 June 2025, Mamuka Khazaradze Sentenced to Eight Months in Jail in Second Verdict for Defying GD Commission⁸⁸Civil Georgia, 23 June 2025, Badri Japaridze Sentenced to Eight Months in Jail in Third Verdict for Defying GD Commission A day later, Strategy Agmashenebeli leader Giorgi Vashadze received the same sentence of seven months and was arrested at his party office.⁸⁹Civil Georgia, 23 June 2025, Giorgi Vashadze Sentenced to Seven Months for Defying GD Commission

Former UNM MP Givi Targamadze, serving as chair of the defense committee between 2004 and 2009, was the fifth to be sentenced on 27 June 2025, receiving to seven months.⁹⁰Civil Georgia, 27 June 2025, Givi Targamadze Sentenced to Seven Months for Defying Tsulukiani Commission An hour later on the same day Nika Melia was sentenced for eight months.⁹¹Civil Georgia, 27 June 2025, Nika Melia Sentenced to Eight Months for Defying Tsulukiani Commission After the weekend, on Tuesday 1 July 2025, Nika Gvaramia was next, also receiving eight months.⁹²Civil Georgia, 1 July 2025, Nika Gvaramia Sentenced to Eight Months in Prison for Defying Tsulukiani Commission Lastly, on 4 July 2025, Irakli Okruashvili was the eight to be sentenced, also receiving eight months.⁹³Civil Georgia, 4 July 2025, Ex-Minister Okruashvili Sentenced to Eight Months in Prison for Defying Tsulukiani Commission

Chazaradze and Bari Japaridze were released two months later by a presidential pardon they did not ask for, as their party had committed to taking part in the municipal elections.⁹⁴Civil Georgia, 5 September 2025, Kavelashvili Pardons Lelo/Strong Georgia’s Khazaradze, Japaridze Ahead of Local Vote However, on 6 November 2025 they were together with the other opposition leaders charged with various crimes, ranging from “sabotage” to “attempts to overthrow the government, with the aim to imprison them for multiple years.⁹⁵Civil Georgia, 6 November 2025, Georgian Authorities to Prosecute Eight Opposition Leaders for ‘Crimes Against State’

5.10 Legal initiatives to ban parties and outlaw foreign support

On 28 March 2025, Georgian Dream faction leader Mamuka Mdinaradze announced the introduction of a bill, the “successor parties law”, which should target opposition groups that are deemed “hostile” to the state by the ruling party.⁹⁶Civil Georgia, 28 March 2025, GD to Ban Opposition Groups Under “Successor Parties” Law, Declare Them Unconstitutional According to him, the law aims to ban political forces “whose activities are identical to those of the collective UNM”. He described those parties as “anti-Georgian, anti-constitutional, anti-national, and criminal”. Georgian Dream als planned to appeal to the Constitutional Court of Georgia to declare UNM and “its satellite parties” unconstitutional. Effectively this was the election promise by Georgian Dream, in order to “make the opposition healthy”. Mdinaradze emphasized, while the investigative committee hearings on the UNM-rule were still ongoing, these hearings “already made clear that the authors of the outrageous crimes committed in the past and their accomplices – political parties acting with a common, hostile purpose towards the country – must leave politics”.

On 15 April 2025 the proposed bill was discussed in the plenary session for a first reading and was unanimously adopted by the 83 MPs present. The draft is considered under an expedited procedure. According to the bill, the Constitutional Court will be able to ban a political party if its “declared objectives, the essence of its activities — including its personnel composition — mirror the declared objectives, essence of activities, and personnel of a party already banned by the court”.⁹⁷IPN, 15 April 2025, Parliament supported the legislative package related to the ban on political parties in the first reading The timeframe for such a decision was set at 14 days during an election period to ensure the created party cannot run in elections. Parties can already be banned by the Consititutional Court if they are considered anti-constitutional. The amendment blocks parties from being re-created and has Georgian Dream’s plans with UNM and “their satellites” in mind.

In parallel, parliament adopted in first reading a bill will prohibit international organizations to organize lectures, seminars, and other public events for the benefit of political parties. In other words, this will prevent international cooperation programs designed to assist in the development of party-democracy in Georgia, for example through programs of the European sister parties and partner organizations, but also IRI or NDI. On top of that, foreign grants will have to be signed by the government, for which a decision term of ten days will apply. If a grant is deemed prohibited, the recipient will be confronted with a fine double the grant.⁹⁸IPN, 15 April 2025, Parliament adopted in the first reading the legislative initiative according to which international donor organizations will no longer be able to issue grants without Government approval

Shortly after the local elections of 4 October 2025 Georgian Dream started the constitutional lawsuit to ban certain opposition parties, as they announced earlier in 2025. The first parties to be barred from political participation were UNM, Lelo and Akhali. Other smaller parties that Georgian Dream had within this scope and which are “closely related” to the other three, including Strategy Aghmashenebeli, Droa, Girchi – More Freedom, European Georgia, Federalists, and Republicans, could face similar action, the party said.⁹⁹Civil Georgia, 28 October 2025, Ruling Party Appeals to Constitutional Court to Ban Three Major Opposition Forces

In their appeal Georgian Dream invoked Article 23 of the Georgian Constitution, which deems inadmissible the establishment and activity of a political party “that aims to overthrow or forcibly change the constitutional order of Georgia, infringe on the independence or violate the territorial integrity of the country, or that propagates war or violence or incites national, ethnic, provincial, religious or social strife.” They argued the opposition attempted “to overthrow or forcibly change the constitutional order of Georgia,” including through alleged mass human rights abuses under UNM rule as well as moves by opposition parties in 2016-2024 to contest the results of several elections, as well as “six direct attempts” [of an overthrow of the constitutional order] in 2019-2024.

5.11 Opposition disunity

Over time, cracks appeared in the opposition unity, partially due to disappointment in the outcomes and lack of perspective of a quick resolve of the political stalemate and partially due to disagreements over the course of action towards the local elections in October 2025. In March 2025, Freedom Square left the Strong Georgia coalition. They transformed their movement into a political party and said to independently pursue their ideals on justice, security, and freedom. ¹⁰⁰Civil Georgia, 9 March 2025, “Freedom Square” Movement Becomes Political Party

Three months later Ana Dolidze announced the departure of “For the People” from the same coalition, stating she wanted to pursue an independent course for her party. She indicated the coalition served its purpose, but that it is now time for the party to return to their “own agenda”.¹⁰¹Civil Georgia, 6 June 2025, Anna Dolidze’s For People Leaves Lelo-Led Strong Georgia Coalition She also emphasized her priority to cement the relations with the Party of European Socialists (PES), the socialdemocratic European umbrella party, to obtain observer status in PES. Strong Georgia’s lead party Lelo is a member of the European liberal ALDE.¹⁰²IPN, 6 June 2025, Ana Dolidze and For People Party leave Strong Georgia coalition, return to independent activities In April 2025, three leading figures of the Girchi-More Freedom left the party.¹⁰³1TV, 3 April 2025, Tsotne Koberidze, Badri Grigalashvili, Boris Chele Kurua quit ‘Girchi – More Freedom On 24 July 2024 Dolidze announced that For the People would not participate in the local elections. However, the party would not join the “boycott” of the other opposition parties. Dolidze, saying “spending time and resources on going from village to village and urging people not to do something is wrong.” She added citizens know very well where justice and injustice is. “It is necessary to release political prisoners and hold fair, new parliamentary elections. This should be the goal.”¹⁰⁴Netgazeti, 24 July 2025, ანა დოლიძე მუნიციპალურ არჩევნებში მონაწილეობას არ მიიღებს

Meanwhile, both Gakharia for Georgia and Lelo denounced to provide clarity whether they would boycott or participate in the local elections. Citizens‘ leader Aleko Elisashvili floated the idea of participation as well.¹⁰⁵IPN, 27 June 2025, Politics 27.06.2025 / 21:49aa Aleko Elisashvili: Let’s sit down, talk, and unite around Salome Zurabishvili – let’s not be afraid to say it, let’s proclaim it. She wouldn’t be a bad candidate for mayor Other opposition parties and blocs committed to a boycott and expected this as well from the dissenting parties.¹⁰⁶The Messenger Online, 28 May 2025, Georgian Opposition Parties Face Dilemmas Elene Khostaria from Droa / Coalition for Change went into a hunger strike on 27 June 2025, vowing only to end it if all opposition parties committed to boycotting the local elections.¹⁰⁷OC Media, 30 June 2025, Georgian opposition politician Khoshtaria starts hunger strike, joined by colleague and activists She was the the only leader of CfC not sent to prison yet.

On 5 July 2025, Strong Georgia – at that moment only existing of Lelo and Citizens – announced they would run in the local elections on 4 October 2025. In a statement they clarified that the fight against the Georgian Dream regime has multiple directions, and that they decided to fight “Ivanishvili’s Russian-Oligarchic regime” in this direction.¹⁰⁸Civil Georgia, 5 July 2025, Lelo/Strong Georgia to Run in October Local Elections, Three Senior Members Dissent Freedom Square, Strong Georgia’s former partner, distanced itself from the decision, but emphasized they would not waste energy with internal opposition disputes.¹⁰⁹1TV, 5 July 2025, Freedom Square criticizes Strong Georgia for participating in elections That advise was not picked up by other opposition parties. Droa’s Elene Khostaria questioned whether Lelo is “weak or a traitor”.¹¹⁰IPN, 5 July 2025, Elene Khoshtaria: What a 4% party like Lelo does certainly doesn’t determine Georgia’s fate. Whether they are weak or traitors – let history judge that; As for us, let’s focus on our work Tina Bokuchava of UNM used similar words, calling it a a “betrayal of the common struggle, not a fight to save the country, but a deal with the regime for an honorable second place”. She added that it is “Lelo’s moral death, we will witness their electoral death as well.”¹¹¹IPN, 5 July 2025, Tina Bokuchava: This is a betrayal of the common struggle, a deal with the regime in exchange for an honorable second place. Today we witnessed Lelo’s moral death — in October, we will witness their electoral death as well On the other hand, For Georgia agreed with Lelo’s decision as the “right one” and offered to join forces with common neutral candidates.¹¹²IPN, 5 July 2025, Levan Gogichaishvili: Lelo – Strong Georgia’s decision is the right one, and I support it. We need to nominate joint, neutral candidates. As for the United National Movement, I’m not interested in their opinion For Georgia’s Levan Gogichaisvili added his argument for participation:

“Participation does not mean legitimizing the government — and you will never convince a single European, for whom municipal elections are a democratic foundation, that refusing to participate is the right move.”

Lelo’s decision triggered three leading members to step down from their political council functions in the party. Saba Buadze, Ana Natsvlishvili and Dea Metreveli said they disagreed with the decision to participate and cannot reconcile with that. However, they said they would remain member of the party.¹¹³IPN, 5 July 2025, Ana Natsvlishvili has left the political council of “Lelo – For a Strong Georgia” On 14 July 2025 representatives of Lelo and For Georgia jointly announced they have agreed on cooperation in the local elections. They agreed to try to find “common candidates for mayors”, aiming for “non-partisan” and “neutral” figures, or alternatively, joint party nominees. The same would apply to majoritarian candidates as well. However, no comments were made on forming joint party lists.¹¹⁴Civil Georgia, 14 July 2025, Lelo, Gakharia’s For Georgia Agree to Cooperate for Local Elections

6. Electoral system

For the first time in Georgia the election for the 150-seat parliament was held under a fully proportional system. A five percent threshold was applied.¹¹⁵Civil Georgia, 1 June 2024, Georgians Gear Up for ‘Unprecedented’ Election Mobilization In 2018 legal changes came into effect replacing the mixed system of proportional and majoritarian district representation with the fully proportional system, per 2024.¹¹⁶Legislative Herald of Georgia, Election Code of Georgia, Article 109.1, consolidated version 26 June 2024¹¹⁷Civil Georgia, 7 December 2018, New Constitution Enters into Force The date for the election was determined by the constitution, which stipulates the elections should take place on the last Saturday of October in the year that the parliamentary term expires. The election was not held in Abkhazia  and South Ossetia / Tskhinvali regions, in lack of Georgian control over them.

The change of election system was triggered when Georgian Dream won a constitutional majority (75%) in the 2016 elections by sweeping 71 out of the 73 majoritarian districts, while having an overall vote share of 48%. Also, in prior elections the former ruling party UNM took advantage of the mixed system by winning most constituencies. Originally the fully proportional system was supposed to start in 2020, but the ruling Georgian Dream singlehandedly postponed this to 2024.¹¹⁸Civil Georgia, 22 July 2023, Explainer | Why do the parties start to merge?

Even though there would no vote for single-mandate constituencies, the election commission used the 2012 election district configuration for administrative and organizational purposes. In short, each municipality is its own election district, while Tbilisi has been divided in 10 districts. The districts ranged in size from 5,800 (Lentekhi) to 154,000 (Batumi) registered voters – see Appendix 3. A total of 3,495,789 domestic voters were registered, lower than in the previous elections.

6.1 Electoral blocs

The changes in the election system also introduced a ban on electoral blocs, which are alliances between parties participating in the elections with a unified candidate list. This step was much scrutinized by most opposition parties, as it would reduce their chances of entering parliament, especially with the 5% threshold in place, if taking part independently. In practice, the new rule did not prevent parties in 2024 to form alliances ahead of the elections (see further down this page) and unify their campaign under one election number – the list number of one of the parties in an alliance. However, candidates on the party list have to be a member of the party carrying the list or be a so-called non-partisan (“independent”) candidate.

The central election authorities reiterated in the summer of 2024 candidates cannot put themselves in name of their party on another party’s list and have to abandon membership of their original party. They have to be registered on the election list as either a member of the party of the list or as a ‘non-party’ (non-partisan) candidate. On 21 August 2024, the CEC clarified the procedure for submitting the candidate list. Every candidate has to submit their party affiliation, indicating party membership for the submitted list, and has to indicate whether they are a party- or non-party candidate.¹¹⁹CESKO, 21 August 2024, პარტიული სიების წარდგენის წესები არჩევნებში მონაწილე პარტიებისთვის

6.2 Electronic voting

After various trials in previous years during local and parliamentary majoritarian by-elections, citizens voted with electronic means in 75% of the 3032 polling stations during the 2024 election, affecting 90% of the voters. In the remaining 769 polling stations the conventional way was applied. These polling stations were located in the countryside and were mostly too far away from the district center for quick assistence if problems appear with electronic equipment. The new electronic technology was not used for the vote, but to electronically scan the ballot immediately after the vote. This was intended to fasten the release of preliminary results, to be followed with a manual count. Only the manual count is legal for the final summary protocol. Also, voter identity verification was done by electronic means, to prevent double voting or impersonation. Below: an instruction video of the election authorities showing the voting procedure including the electronic scan immediately after the vote.

Georgia moved towards a partial electronic voting mechanism based on recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR. Delayed result publication and imbalances in summary protocols in the 2020 elections aggravated public trust in the results and the integrity of the entire electoral process. Public trust in the elections in Georgia has suffered for years from a range of recurring violations, irregularities and procedural errors.¹²⁰International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), 22 November 2023, Use Of Electronic Technologies In The Voting Process: Assessment Of Electronic Machines Introduced In Georgia

Smartmatic provides the electronic technology for the vote scanning.¹²¹European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE), 2 April 2024, New Voting Technologies In Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections The company, using a web of foreign holdings to obscure its Venezuelan origins, has come under scrutiny for allegations of bribery in the Philippines. In Georgia, the central election commission got critical questions about the tender procedure in which Smartmatic was the only bidder.¹²²Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 19 August 2024, სკანდალი ფირმის გარშემო, რომლის ტექნოლოგიებითაც ტარდება არჩევნები საქართველოში – ქრთამი, ფულის გათეთრება და აშშ-ის ბრალდებები

6.3 Voting abroad

For Georgian citizens abroad polling stations were established in areas with 50 to 3000 registered voters. The opposition campaigned to open more polling stations than before to reduce travel for voters abroad.¹²³JAM News, 3 April 2024, “Crossing half the continent to cast a vote”: Georgians abroad want to participate in Georgia elections The president called for “full mobilization” of the diaspora and urged them to register.¹²⁴Civil Georgia, 27 May 2024, President Calls for ‘Full Mobilization’ of Diaspora in October Elections

Citizens living abroad could register at their respective diplomatic missions between 15 August and 7 October 2024, after which the final polling station distribution was made. Prior to the deadline, CESKO announced on 26 September, 60 precincts in 42 countries would be opened, based on the number of 65,508 registered voters at that moment, which was significantly more than the 45 precincts in 2020. Precincts were established in countries which did not have precincts in previous elections, which included the United Arab Emirates, Finland, (South) Korea, Japan, and Australia.¹²⁵CESKO, 26 September 2024, “60 PECs Will Serve Voters Living Abroad in 42 Foreign Countries

After the deadline for the registration of voters abroad, the central election commission announced on 10 October a total of 95,834 eligible voters had been registered abroad.¹²⁶CESKO, 10 October 2024, Information On Participation Of Voters Living Abroad In Upcoming Elections As result of the additional 30,000 voters compared to the earlier released number, the election commission decided to open seven more precincts abroad, bringing the total number to 67. These were in cities where it already had created precincts: New York, Berlin, Barcelona, Rome, Athens, Thessaloniki and Paris.

Despite calls by the diaspora and president Salome Zurabishvili to open a precinct in the French city Strasbourg,¹²⁷Sakartvelos Ambebi – Georgian News, 11 October 2024, President Urges CEC to Establish Polling Station in Strasbourg where Georgia maintains a diplomatic mission, the election commission declined this request.¹²⁸IPN, 12 October 202, Chairman of the CEC on the request to open a polling station in Strasbourg: the institution is guided by the information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not on the basis of the president or any other institution4

6.4 Gender quotas and due process election code

Georgian Dream adopted amendments to the election code in April 2024, abolishing the mandatory quota for women. Under the rule at least one out of every four persons on a party list should be of a different gender than the majority. This ensured at least 25% of the candidates would be female, also in the top part of the list. The amendments to abolish the quota were introduced by opposition party Girchi and supported by the ruling party, after the two parties agreed on the appointment of the chair of the central election commission CESKO. Girchi leader Iago Khvichia said the abolition of gender quota was “morally important”.¹²⁹Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 1 April 2024, „გირჩი” და „ოცნება“ პარტიულ სიაში ქალთა კვოტირების გაუქმებაზე შეთანხმდნენ In May the presidential veto on the amendment was overruled.

On 25 June and 1 July 2024, both the Council of Europe Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR released an opinion on the amendments stating they are “not consistent” with Georgia’s constitutional and international obligations to eliminate inequality.¹³⁰Civil Georgia, 1 July 2024, OSCE/ODIHR: Abolition of Women’s Quotas on Party Election Lists “Not Consistent” with Georgia’s Obligations¹³¹Civil Georgia, 25 June 2024, Venice Commission Opinion on Abolishing Quotas on Women MPs Both organizations said the step represented a setback for the advancement of gender equality in Georgia and urged for the introduction of alternative measures to stimulate women’s political representation in Georgia. The Venice Commission raised “serious concerns regarding the stability of electoral law” as the amendments were adopted less than a year prior to the elections. Other changes to the electoral code adopted in the same period included allowing so-called “delegates”, party candidates in electoral districts, which some see as a semi-return to the majoritarian system.

Changes to the election code also touched the functioning of the Central Election Commission. Among other things, its advisory group was abolished. The group consists of a representative of the Public Defender as well as the national and international experts selected by observer organizations and is tasked with making recommendations to the CEC regarding the dispute review process. Also, the decision making process in the CEC was modified for situations in which a two-third majority of its full membership is required. If such a decision cannot be passed during a CEC meeting, a revote in the same meeting with a simple majority of the full membership would be enough to pass.¹³²Civil Georgia, 30 May 2024, Parliament Adopts Amendments to Election Code

The Venice Commission criticized the lack of a “broadly consensual and inclusive process”, which, combined with the timeline and dismissal of international recommendations, undermines public confidence in the elections.¹³³Civil Georgia, 25 June 2024, Venice Commission Critical in Follow-Up Opinion on Amendments to Electoral Code

7. Parties

A total of 18 parties finalized their registration for the elections and have been accepted by the CESKO election commission to be on the ballot. During the registration process, 27 parties were accepted and 11 parties were rejected/refused for administrative reasons. Of the 27 accepted parties, 19 submitted a candidate list. The remaining parties either had their registration withdrawn (as they became part of a coalition) or they simply did not submit a list by the deadline. The candidate list of one party was refused as it contained errors that were not fixed in time – hence 18 parties are on the ballot. All this is elaborated in the following paragraph.

7.1 Alliances

The 2020 elections had a one time 1 percent threshold, but the reintroduction of the 5 percent threshold for 2024 forced many opposition parties in parliament to join forces to increase their chances to get re-elected in Parliament. In 2020, only two parties, ruling Georgian Dream and the main opposition force UNM, would have passed the 5% threshold, indicating the need for the majority of parties to unite.

With the ban on electoral blocs (unified candidate lists) in place, a range of opposition parties has grouped together and registered common party entities at the Central Election Commission CESKO. In practice, this was not very different compared to previous elections, except that candidates of third parties cannot be on the list in name of their original party. They would have to become either a party member of the list-bearer or a non-partisan candidate (independent, not a member of any party).

In the past small opposition parties united around the largest opposition force United National Movement (UNM), but in 2024 the opposition followed a strategy of multiple groupings to offer a variety of choices to voters. This served especially those who disenfranchised from the ruling Georgian Dream, while also finding UNM unacceptable.

Various alliances between parties have been formed throughout the summer of 2024. An overview.

• 1. Georgian Dream was planning to run independently, but decided to take up their own anti-western (proxy) spinoff People’s Power on a common list.¹³⁴The Messenger, 17 July 2024, Georgian Dream and People’s Power Announce Joint Participation in Parliamentary Elections People’s Power was responsible for floating the foreign agent law in 2022 and anti-LGBTI legislation, while also being a testing ground for the most wild conspiracy theories about the west, Ukraine and the so called “Global War Party”.
  2. United National Movement and Strategy Aghmashenebeli joined forces in 2023 under the name “Unity“.¹³⁵Open Caucasus Media, 21 July 2023, Georgia’s UNM and Strategy Aghmashenebeli to run joint election list Upon presentation of the “Unity – to Save Georgia” platform on 8 July 2024, various independents were introduced as part of the coalition.¹³⁶Civil Georgia, 8 July 2024, UNM, Strategy Aghmashenebeli Announce Political Platform: ‘Unity – to Save Georgia’ On 17 August 2024 European Georgia joined the coalition, after a part of the party split away over strong disagreements about leadership elections.¹³⁷IPN, 1 August 2024, Giga Bokeria leaves “European Georgia” Other parties that would fit the political profile of this bloc decided to form other alliances. The extra-parliamentary party ‘Progress and Freedom‘ had several members on the candidate list, of which party leader Kakha Okriashvili was elected.
  3. Lelo for Georgia, For the People and the newly found Freedom Square formed the alliance “Strong Georgia” (SG).¹³⁸Civil Georgia, 17 July 2024, Three More Opposition Groups Join Forces Ahead of Crucial Elections Citizens joined the coalition in August 2024, after initial hesitation.¹³⁹Open Caucasus Media, 24 July 2024, Aleko Elisashvili’s Citizens Party ‘in negotiations’ with growing Georgian opposition alliance Lelo was elected in Parliament in 2020 (formed in 2019) and gained momentum during the campaign period, according to polls.
  4. Girchi-More Freedom, Droa and the new Akhali (“new”) party have grouped under the name “Coalition for Change“.¹⁴⁰Civil Georgia, 9 July 2024, Ahali, Girchi-More Freedom and Droa Unite Ahead of Polls The Republican Party of Georgia joined the coalition on 18 August 2024. Akhali was founded in March 2024 by former UNM leader Nika Melia and Nika Gvaramia (former UNM justice minister, former head of both Rustavi2 and Mtavari tv-channels). Akhali seemed to have taken a chunk of the UNM supporters, according to polls.
  5. Alliance of Patriots and Alt-Info united forces for the elections.¹⁴¹Open Caucasus Media, 11 June 2024, Georgia’s Alt Info to run in elections with Alliance of Patriots The election authorities revoked the party registration of the “Conservative Movement”, the party vehicle of the far-right, ultra-conservative and pro-Russian Alt-Info. A like minded marginal party, “Georgian Idea”, offered their registration to Alt-Info but the authorities revoked that party license as well. Alt-Info was responsible for many anti-LGBTI attacks in recent years and ran a TV-station geared to their agenda and was considered a radical extension of Georgian Dream. The two allegedly fell out in 2023, with Georgian Dream’s own radical-conservative shift in play, dismissing the need for Alt-Info.

7.2 Single party entities

• 1. For Georgia voiced avances to Lelo for Georgia, which did not return the flirts.¹⁴²IPN, 20 June 2024, ქართული პრესის მიმოხილვა 20.06.2024 For Georgia, led by former Georgian Dream prime minister Giorgi Gakharia, then decided to take part in the elections independently. The polls suggested they could be right about that.¹⁴³Radio Free Europe, 25 July 2024, Never Mind Unseating Georgian Dream, Georgia’s Opposition Must First Overcome Internal Frictions After a negative ruling by an international arbitration court over Anaklia port, against the plaintiffs, Lelo leader Mamuka Khazaradze, For Georgia leaders “grilled” the Lelo leader, effectively putting any potential coalition to an end,¹⁴⁴IPN, 30 July 2024, Beka Liluashvili: The international arbitration court put an end to the Anaklia port case – Mamuka Khazaradze lost the dispute, it will be difficult for him, but he will have to admit it even though the president performed a last ditch attempt in September to get the two parties to an agreement.
  2. Girchi, the original one founded in 2016, has indicated to take part independently.
  3. Labour Party did not seek an alliance to run with.
  4. The election registration of the European Socialists, a rebrand of the faction of the Alliance of Patriots, was cancelled in early August by the election authorities (see below in Registered parties foldout).

7.3 Registered parties

On 30 August 2024 the registration of parties (“election subjects”) at CESKO was closed and finalized.¹⁴⁵CESKO, 1 September 2024, The Registration Of Parties For The October 26 Parliamentary Elections In The CEC Has Been Completed In total 27 parties were registered and accepted by CESKO for the elections. Two weeks earlier, the sequence (or list) numbers of the eligible election subjects were announced by CESKO.¹⁴⁶CESKO, Elections Sequence Numbers Of Election Subjects The numbers were based on both the applications of parties and their requests for numbers as well as a lottery based system for those which did not submit a request for a number.

Parties elected in Parliament in 2020 were automatically eligible to take part in the elections, pending a confirmation statement to be submitted to the election authorities CESKO on the 57th day before the elections at the latest. This concerned 13 so-called “election subjects” (parties).¹⁴⁷CESKO, Election Subjects – Information On Registration Procedures For Parties Participating In The Parliamentary Elections Of Georgia Of these 13, ten completed their registration for the elections. Three parties did not submit their confirmation statement: Republican Party of Georgia (list #11), Progress and Freedom (#18) and Law and Justice (#22). The Republicans are part of the “Coalition for Change” alliance and chose to not finalize their registration.

Some of the 27 registered parties became part of alliances and would therefore not submit their own candidate list and would therefore eventually drop out from the ballot as well. This applied to Strategy Builder (list #1), European Georgia (#2), Citizens (#7), For the People (#48).

7.4 Rejected parties

The registration of 20 parties were either refused at the registration stage (11) or canceled during the submission of candidate lists (9). By August 2024, the registration of eleven parties was rejected on various grounds. The lack of enough supportive signatures before the stipulated deadline was the most common reason for rejection of the registration. On 29 August 2024, CESKO explained the rejection of three parties.¹⁷³IPN, 29 August 2024, ცესკო განმარტავს, რატომ ეთქვა უარი არჩევნებში რეგისტრაციაზე ფრიდონ ინჯიას, შოთა შალელაშვილის და აკაკი ასათიანის პარტიებს

They rejected the registration of the European Socialists, even though the party had MPs in parliament, which would automatically qualify a party and dismiss it from the requirement to collect 25,000 signatures before 1 August. However, the deputies of the European Socialists were originally elected as members of the Alliance of Patriots. Henceforth, that party was automatically qualified and the European Socialists had to submit signatures which they failed to do. The Traditionalists also failed to submit signatures, while “Generations for Georgia” submitted the required number of signatures in time, but some were considered invalid. As a result, the election authorities counted less than 25,000 signatures. The party appealed to the court beyond the deadline for it, as a result of which the protest was not considered.

Upon registration of the candidate lists by 26 September 2024, three parties volunteered to withdraw their election registration based on election code article 113, clause 12a (Citizens, For the People and the Green Party). Five other parties were taken out of the registration after they did not submit a candidate list – some of which were part of unified coalitions (Strategy and European Georgia). The candidate list of the Social Democratic Party was refused as it contained errors that were not fixed in time – hence it was also cancelled from the election registration.

8. Polling

Just like in other election cycles in Georgia, a large discrepancy can be seen between government affiliated surveys (Tbilisi based GORBI, ordered by Imedi TV) versus other polls (Edison, ISSA and Savanta – mostly ordered by government critical media). The most striking difference is the systematically high polling of Georgian Dream by GORBI of around 60%, which Georgian Dream claimed since January 2024 as evidence that the constitutional majority is within arms’ reach. GORBI also systematically claims only one or two opposition parties will manage to pass the 5% threshold. Other polling agencies rate Georgian Dream around 32-34%, while at least four opposition forces got double digit support, enough for a majority together, with two other opposition parties hovering around the threshold (Girchi NPC and Labour). In 2024, the discrepancy between GORBI and Edison is larger than during previous election campaigns.¹⁸³Civil Georgia, 9 October 2024, October Elections: Odds, Context, Past Trends

Since coming to power in 2012, when Georgian Dream received 55% of the vote, the party didn’t receive more than 50% in parliamentary elections,¹⁸⁴Radio Tavisupleba, 15 August 2024, “ოცნების” წინასწარი რეიტინგები და ცდომილებები შედეგებში making the recent claims by the GORBI polls unlikely – especially taking into account the political situation in Georgia and the wide rejection of Georgian Dream’s political path away from the West. In local elections Georgian Dream received 50.8% (2014), 55.8% (2017) and 46.7% (2021) respectively. Experts and the opposition consider the GORBI polls “fairy tales”, and say it is impossible given the current situation the party would reach 50%, let alone 60%. Georgian Dream and its affiliated pollster have a trackrecord of overestimating support for GD. Shortly before the 2020 elections, Bidzina Ivanishvili estimated the support between 54 and 63%, while the party in reality officially received 48% of the vote – which was disputed by the opposition as fraudulent.¹⁸⁵Agenda, 8 October 2020, GD chairman Ivanishvili: ‘I condemn all forms of violence undermining electoral process, quality of democracy’

8.1 ISSA

In two ISSA polls in April and June 2024, ordered by the Civil Society Foundation, in which timespan the foreign agent law was adopted, support for Georgian Dream dropped from 45.6% to 34.4%, with UNM increasing from 13.6% to16.9%. The Akhali party, founded in April and missing the first ISSA poll, received 12.4% support in the June poll. Other opposition parties improved their rating as well, with Lelo (8%), For Georgia (6.9%) and Girchi-MF/Droa (5.1%) all passing the threshold according to the poll in June 2024.¹⁸⁶PolitPro, Georgia: All election polls at a glance

Giga Bokeria, leader of European Georgia, published the various scenario’s for opposition alliances that were surveyed by ISSA.¹⁸⁷Facebook Giga Bokeria, 8 July 2024 He argued the opposition should have multiple centers of gravity instead of a single united alliance centred around UNM.

8.2 Edison

A Formula TV commissioned Edison poll, held between 11 and 24 July 2024, showed a further decrease of support for Georgian Dream to 32.4%, while Unity polled at 17.3%.¹⁸⁸Formula TV, 28 July 2024, როგორია პარტიების რეიტინგი – Edison Research-ის კვლევა Other pro-western opposition parties and blocs also reached the double digits according to the poll. Strong Georgia received 12.8% and For Georgia 11.2%, which seems to indicate their strategy to remain independent pays off. The Coalition for Change polled at 9.9%. The libertarian oriented and culturally conservative Girchi (NPC) seemed to gain traction at 5.2%. Other parties remained below the 5% threshold: Labour Party 3.3%, Alliance of Patriots/Alt Info 2.6%, Citizens 2.2% and European Georgia 1.9% – the latter two would join one of the coalitions in August. According to the poll 72% made up their mind who to vote for, which is higher than in previous elections at this stage.

In September and October 2024, three consecutive Edison polls (1-15 September, 10-22 September and 1-18 October) confirmed the pattern of the earlier ISSA and Edison polls and dismissed the GORBI polls. According to Edison, Georgian Dream has 32-34% support,¹⁸⁹JAM News, 28 September 2024, Edison Research’s pre-election survey in Georgia: “Dream” at 32% and “National Movement” at 20%¹⁹⁰Formula TV, 23 October 2024, როგორია პარტიების რეიტინგი – Edison Research-ის კვლევა 1-18 ოქტომბერი while some shifts took place between the various opposition coalitions – partially due to additional parties joining the coalitions since the Edison poll of July 2024. Also, 71% of the respondents said another party should be given a chance (to govern).¹⁹¹JAM News, 20 September 2024, Georgia elections: 71% Support giving another party a chance’

5 / 6

A few notable developments compared to the July poll of Edison: The Unity – National Movement alliance got 20% support in the first of three polls, a plus of 2.7%, likely due to European Georgia joining the coalition, but fell down in later polls to 18% – still with distance the second largest force. Strong Georgia, which polled 12.8% in July, did not seem to have capitalized on Citizens joining the coalition in August – which was good for 2.2% in the July polls. In the latter three polls Strong Georgia hovered between 10-12%.

Labour Party however, increased their polling with 1.7% and hovers around the 5% threshold. Secondly, Coalition for Georgia polled higher than previously, at the same level as For Georgia, which remains stable around 11-12%. In October, Coalition for Change improved their support in the Edison poll to 14%. For a small party, Girchi (NPC) fluctuates around the threshold between the latter three Edison polls. The Alliance of Patriots saw a small boost to roughly 3% – which is within the margin of error. Lastly, a new entry in the polls around 1% is Chven, led by Power in Unity anti-occupation activist Davit Katsarava. They dropped from the October poll, after Katsarava and a handful other leading figures suddenly left the party.

In the second half of September 2024, Edison mapped the voting behaviour along the gender and generational divides. The gender split showed that women vote significantly more (social-)liberal than men, who prefer socially conservative parties such as Georgian Dream (8% difference), Alliance of Patriots (4%) and Girchi NPC (4%).

As for the generational divide, Georgian Dream is least popular among the youngest voters till 24 year (14%). Among young voters GD is the fourth popular party, behind Unity, Coalition for Change and For Georgia that all polled 20%. Also, the socially conservative and libertarian oriented Girchi NPC is significantly more popular among young voters than among older voters. Noteworthy is also the generational exchange between For Georgia and Georgian Dream – as if they are communicating vessels. Georgian Dream’s popularity has a linear increment with age, being most popular among 65+ year old citizens (46%), far above the overall average of 33%.

8.3 GORBI

In March 2024, GORBI polled 60.4 percent support for Georgian Dream, while UNM/Strategy Builder could count on 12.6% support according to the poll. None of the other parties received more than 5% support, with Lelo (4.7%) and European Georgia (4.5%) being closest.¹⁹²Imedi, 10 April 2024, GORBI poll shows if parliamentary elections were held this week, Georgian Dream party would receive 60.4% of votes

In early August 2024, GORBI claimed GD has 59.3 percent support, followed by the UNM centered Unity coalition (13.1%), Lelo centered Strong Georgia coalition (5.8%) and Akhali centered Coalition for Change (5.5%). According to the poll other parties would not pass the 5% barrier, with For Georgia (4.8%) just missing out within the margin of error. In this scenario Georgian Dream would secure 107 seats, six short of the constitutional majority of 75% the party aspires to.¹⁹³Imedi, 14 August 2024, GORBI poll shows if parliamentary elections were held this week, Georgian Dream party would receive 59.3% of votes Prime Minister and GD campaign leader Irakli Kobakhidze said the gap would easily be bridged by “maximum mobilization of voters” and conducting the “right campaign”. The poll still considered European Georgia as a separate election subject, polling at 2.2%. Later in August the party joined the Unity alliance.

Another GORBI poll six weeks later, in the second half of September, showed a similar pattern with GD remaining stable at 59.5% and a few shifts between the opposition: Strong Georgia fell below the threshold, while Coalition for Change was polled in the double digits at 10.3%. Other parties fell short of the 5%.¹⁹⁴Imedi, 8 October 2024, GORBI poll shows if parliamentary elections were held this week, Georgian Dream party would receive 59.5% of votes The last GORBI poll, held between 12-21 October 2024, claimed 60.2% support for the ruling party, while Unity/UNM polled at 15.4% and Coalition for Change at 9.0%. According to GORBI, other parties would remain well below the 5% threshold.¹⁹⁵Imedi, 23 October 2024, GORBI poll shows if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, Georgian Dream party would receive 60.2% of votes

8.4 Savanta

In September and October 2024, two polls were held by the British survey agency Savanta, ordered by Mtavari TV.¹⁹⁶Mtavari, 23 October 2024, ბრიტანული კომპანია SAVANTA-ს გამოკითხვა | კვლევის შედეგები სრულად Both polls gave the advantage to Coalition for Change as second largest party over Unity/UNM – which other polls, including GORBI, systematically polled as second most popular. The support for Georgian Dream was similar to the Edison and ISSA polls, 35-36%. Coalition for Change Co-founder Nika Gvaramia of Coalition for Change is also the co-founder and director of Mtavari TV.

9. Appendix

3. Electoral districts

The following tabel shows the electoral districts with the number of registered voters, actual votes and the turnout – according to the district protocols. Tbilisi was divided in 10 districts. There is a slight discrepancy between the grand totals of this table (based on the district protocols) and the official grand total as reported by CESKO. Noteworthy is the relative high number of invalid ballots in all districts of Adjara (up to 4%) and in multiple districts in Kakheti and Kvemo Kartli (between 2.5 and 3%), well above the average of 1.66%. Especially in Batumi, the 2nd city of the country, this had quite an impact with nearly 3000 votes having been invalidated. In Tbilisi this was well below average.

#	District	Reg. voters	Cast votes	Valid votes	Invalid votes224According to the district protocols. There are some discrepancies between the invalid ballot count noted on the protocol and the delta of cast minus valid party votes. Total discrepancy over all districts is 31 votes on a grand total of 35,011. All cast and party sums match.		Turnout
1	Tbilisi – Mtatsminda	53540	35737	35407	329	0.92%	66.75%
2	Tbilisi – Vake	110528	76984	76378	606	0.79%	69.65%
3	Tbilisi – Saburtalo	143099	96782	95919	867	0.90%	67.63%
4	Tbilisi – Krtsanisi	42028	22880	22550	330	1.44%	54.44%
5	Tbilisi – Isani	117408	64257	63529	724	1.13%	54.73%
6	Tbilisi – Samgori	150203	83431	82383	1048	1.26%	55.55%
7	Tbilisi – Chugureti	67233	41251	40806	448	1.09%	61.36%
8	Tbilisi – Didube	61717	41362	40962	398	0.96%	67.02%
9	Tbilisi – Nadzaladevi	135315	80777	79919	861	1.06%	50.70%
10	Tbilisi – Gldani	150072	87048	86016	1036	1.19%	58.00%
11	Sagarejo	46471	25404	24909	502	1.98%	54.67%
12	Gurjaani	49850	32867	32340	527	1.60%	65.93%
13	Sighnaghi	27949	18360	18102	256	1.39%	65.69%
14	Dedoplistskaro	20352	12717	12572	144	1.13%	62.49%
15	Lagodekhi	38349	21696	21130	565	2.60%	56.58%
16	Kvareli	27337	17653	17236	418	2.37%	64.58%
17	Telavi	55050	33146	32668	478	1.44%	60.21%
18	Akhmeta	29486	15980	15600	376	2.35%	54.20%
19	Tianeti	10797	6622	6525	97	1.46%	61.33%
20	Rustavi	106310	62236	61260	976	1.57%	58.54%
21	Gardabani	74270	33899	33025	866	2.55%	45.64%
22	Marneuli	101572	44415	43198	1189	2.68%	43.73%
23	Bolnisi	56341	26463	25578	884	3.34%	46.97%
24	Dmanisi	23068	12773	12411	361	2.83%	55.37%
25	Tsalka	19203	8978	8791	187	2.08%	46.75%
26	Tetritskaro	20017	12032	11823	207	1.72%	60.11%
27	Mtskheta	44995	29617	29156	457	1,54%	65.82%
28	Dusheti	27226	15311	15096	216	1.41%	56.24%
29	Kazbegi	5811	3518	3470	48	1.36%	60.54%
30	Kaspi	38973	23021	22642	384	1.67%	59.07%
32	Gori	111656	66877	65944	928	1.39%	59.90%
33	Kareli	37212	23328	22887	442	1.89%	62.69%
35	Khashuri	47874	28640	28281	360	1.26%	59.82%
36	Borjomi	26643	16213	16004	209	1.26%	60.85%
37	Akhaltsikhe	33535	21572	21294	278	1.29%	64.33%
38	Adigeni	15418	10754	10588	169	1.57%	69.75%
39	Aspindza	9771	7160	7081	79	1.10%	73.28%
40	Akhalkalaki	37496	21015	20718	297	1.41%	56.05%
41	Ninotsminda	20724	12229	12015	214	1.75%	59.01%
43	Oni	6967	4590	4528	65	1.42%	65.88%
44	Ambrolauri	11706	8235	8136	98	1.19%	70.35%
45	Tsageri	10430	6956	6852	103	1.48%	66.69%
46	Lentekhi	5795	3416	3370	41	1.20%	58.95%
47	Mestia	8955	5427	5368	59	1.09%	60.60%
48	Kharagauli	18897	13498	13288	209	1.55%	71.43%
49	Terjola	32032	20871	20425	449	2.15%	65.16%
50	Sachkhere	40200	27806	27487	319	1.15%	69.17%
51	Zestafoni	52906	32066	31512	551	1.72%	60.61%
52	Baghdadi	20704	12799	12595	204	1.59%	61.82%
53	Vani	23356	14667	14383	282	1.92%	62.80%
54	Samtredia	43568	25269	24770	500	1.98%	58.00%
55	Khoni	21748	14065	13716	343	2.44%	64.67%
56	Chiatura	40801	24052	23677	372	1.55%	58.95%
57	Tkibuli	20020	12342	12178	164	1.33%	61.65%
58	Tskaltubo	49206	28941	28524	418	1.44%	58.82%
59	Kutaisi	152506	81871	80692	1176	1.44%	53.68%
60	Ozurgeti	58288	36709	36083	623	1.70%	62.98%
61	Lanchkhuti	27254	16839	16565	280	1.66%	61.79%
62	Chokhatauri	17366	11887	11666	217	1.83%	68.45%
63	Abasha	19727	12751	12533	217	1.70%	64.64%
64	Senaki	38161	22439	22092	352	1.57%	58.80%
65	Martvili	30822	19972	19547	413	2.07%	64.80%
66	Khobi	26500	16314	16024	289	1.77%	61.56%
67	Zugdidi	116968	55682	54741	932	1.67%	47.60%
68	Tsalenjikha	27547	15276	15004	272	1.78%	55.45%
69	Chkhorotsku	20829	13606	13340	265	1.95%	65.32%
70	Poti	40512	22223	21883	341	1.53%	54.86%
79	Batumi	154357	94701	91845	2841	3.00%	61.35%
80	Keda	15581	11849	11451	398	3.36%	76.05%
81	Kobuleti	66235	41750	40471	1269	3.04%	63.03%
82	Shuakhevi	14454	9828	9539	290	2.95%	68.00%
83	Khelvachauri	43271	28631	27397	1238	4.32%	66.17%
84	Khulo	23221	14927	14588	341	2.28%	64.28%
87	Abroad	95910	34530	34296	284	0.82%	36.00%
Total225The grand total of registered voters based on the districts and abroad is 3,591,699, but a large number of voters registered abroad are duplicate with domestically registered voters. CESKO reported a grand total of 3,508,294 registered (unique) voters. The sum of invalid ballots is 34,976, but the number on the final protocol is 34,974.		3,508,294	2,111,790	2,076,779	34,976	1.66%	60.19%
Sources: CESKO. Definition election districts and precincts;226CESKO, Districts 2024 elections Number of voters per 14 October;227CESKO, 22 October 2024, Number of voters in each election district as of 14 October 2024 Election results data provided by CESKO on 13 November 2024 based on summary protocols.228CESKO, 13 November 2024, არჩევნებში მონაწილეთა რაოდენობა შემაჯამებელი ოქმების მიხედვით გენდერული სტატისტიკა (ქვეყნის მასშტაბით) (pdf) (redundant: number of voters per 15 July229CESKO, 30 August 2024, Number of voters in each election district as of 15 July 2024)

4. Polling stations abroad

Election precincts in foreign countries for the elections of the Georgian Parliament on 26 October 2024, listed per precinct number (#). In total 67 precincts were created in 42 countries. As the regulations stipulated a precinct should have a minimum of 50 and a maximum of 3000 registered voters, in some cities multiple precincts were created. In those cases, the polling stations were on the same address. The result sheet below is based on the precinct protocols. A few discrepancies between the invalid ballots and sums have been noted.

The total turnout was 36%, double compared 2020, but there was a high variation between the countries. Less than 4% in Kazakhstan and 70-80% in smaller diaspora countries. Large diaspora centers in the United States, Germany and United Kingdom were good for the brunt of the turnout at around 50%. However, in Azerbaijan with three precincts in Baku, the turnout was less than 10%. In general, the turnout in the former Soviet area stood low, including in Armenia and Belarus. Also in Greece with seven precincts (nearly 17,500 registered voters), turnout was relatively low at 23.8%.

#	Country	City	Reg. voters	Cast votes	Valid votes	Invalid votes	Turnout
1	Austria	Vienna	1574	756	749	7	48.03%
2	Azerbaijan	Baku	2738	292	292	0	10.66%
3			2617	154	152	2	5.88%
4			1941	195	195	0	10.05%
5	United States	Washington DC	1328	608	603	5	45.78%
6		New York, NY	2986	1548	1541	7	51.84%
7			2949	1418	1416	2	48.08%
8			2914	1391	1387	4	47.74%
9		San Francisco, CA	859	452	449	3	52.62%
10	Belarus	Minsk	936	90	89	1	9.62%
11	Belgium	Brussels	2235	887	882	5	39.69%
12	Bulgaria	Sofia	110	41	41	0	37.27%
13	Germany	Berlin	1795	939	936	4	52.31%	230Actual difference calculation is 3.
14		Frankfurt am Main	2845	1383	1378	5	48.61%
15		Munich	1841	1056	1053	3	57.36%
16		Stuttgart	1201	807	798	9	67.19%
17	Denmark	Copenhagen	147	105	104	1	71.43%
18	Great Britain	London	2994	1343	1339	4	44.86%
19	Spain	Madrid	2146	759	756	3	35.37%
20		Barcelona	1697	663	656	7	39.07%
21	Estonia	Tallinn	329	229	338	1	69.60%
22	Turkey	Ankara	633	104	104	0	16.43%
23		Istanbul	1794	290	285	5	16.16%
24		Trabzon	792	396	391	5	50.00%
25	Ireland	Dublin	1745	624	623	1	35.76%
26	Israel	Ramat Gan (Tel Aviv)	2237	733	723	10	32.77%
27	Italy	Rome	1990	581	580	1	29.20%
28		Bari	2186	802	797	5	36.69%
29		Milan	2252	1067	1062	12	47.38%	231Actual difference calculation is 5.
30	Canada	Ottawa, Ontario	739	264	261	3	35.72%
31	Cyprus	Nicosia	630	273	271	2	43.33%
32	Latvia	Riga	187	107	106	1	57.22%
33	Lithuania	Vilnius	358	256	253	3	71.51%
34	Moldova	Chisinau	101	40	40	0	39.60%
35	Netherlands	The Hague	732	477	477	0	65.16%
36	Poland	Warsaw	2426	1013	1005	7	41.76%	232Actual difference calculation is 8.
37	Portugal	Lisbon	347	172	172	0	49.57%
38	Greece	Athens	2834	805	792	10	28.41%	233Actual difference calculation is 13.
39			2784	754	725	29	27.08%
40			2851	743	743	8	26.06%	2348 invalid noted on protocol, but the total is equal to the sum of the (valid) party votes. Likely this was erroneously not entered as 751.
41		Thessaloniki	2039	360	355	5	17.66%
42			2135	369	362	7	17.28%
43	France	Paris	2188	662	652	10	30.26%
44	Slovakia	Bratislava	1010	218	217	0	21.49%
45	Armenia	Yerevan	919	72	72	0	7.83%
46	Uzbekistan	Tashkent	131	50	50	0	38.17%
47	Hungary	Budapest	379	270	267	3	71.24%
48	Kuwait	Al Kuwait	92	50	48	2	54.35%
49	Kazakhstan	Astana	1633	59	59	0	3.61%
50	Sweden	Stockholm	1191	558	553	5	46.85%
51	Switzerland	Bern	545	321	320	1	58.90%
52	Czech Republic	Prague	772	477	469	7	61.79%	235Actual difference calculation is 8.
53	Qatar	Doha	124	60	58	2	48.39%
54	China	Beijing	119	57	57	0	47.90%
55	Norway	Oslo	123	89	87	2	72.36%
56	United Arab Emirates	Abu Dhabi	247	152	152	0	61.54%
57	Finland	Helsinki	125	105	104	1	84.00%
58	South Korea	Seoul	76	53	53	0	69.74%
59	Japan	Tokyo	67	48	46	2	71.64%
60	Australia	Canberra	109	50	50	0	45.87%
61	United States	New York	2974	1534	1525	9	51.58%
62	Germany	Berlin	1960	1082	1079	3	55.20%
63	Spain	Barcelona	1987	849	848	1	42.73%
64	Italy	Rome	1665	486	485	1	29.19%
65	Greece	Athens	2790	722	722	35	25.88%	23635 invalid noted on protocol, but the total is equal to the sum of the (valid) party votes. Likely this was erroneously not entered as 757.
66		Thessaloniki	2029	398	393	10	19.62%	237Actual difference calculation is 5.
67	France	Paris	2681	763	759	3	28.46%	238Actual difference calculation is 4.
Total			95610	34530	34296	234	36.00%
Sources: CESKO.239CESKO, 26 September 2024, Election precincts in other states for the elections of the Parliament of Georgia on October 26, 2024 (pdf) Updated list:240CESKO, 11 October 2024, საქართველოს პარლამენტის 2024 წლის 26 ოქტომბრის არჩევნებისთვის სხვა სახელმწიფოში საარჩევნო უბნები (pdf); PEC members abroad:241CESKO, 16 October 2024, საქართველოს პარლამენტის 2024 წლის 26 ოქტომბრის არჩევნებისთვის სხვა სახელმწიფოში საარჩევნო უბნების შემადგენლობა (pdf); Protocols election precincts abroad via election dashboard;242CESKO, Dashboard election results

References and footnotes

• 1
  Jelger Groeneveld, Platform Raam, 21 October 2024, In Georgië gaan de verkiezingen over de democratie zelf
• 2
  Civil Georgia, 28 May 2024, Breaking: Parliament Overrides President’s Veto on Foreign Agents Law, Adopts the Agents’ Law
• 3
  Radio Free Europe, 9 July 2024, EU Halts Georgia’s Accession, Freezes Financial Assistance
• 4
  US Department of State, 31 July 2024, United States to Pause Assistance to the Government of Georgia
• 5
  US Department of Defense, 5 July 2024, Postponement of Exercise Noble Partner Announcement
• 6
  Civil Georgia, 10 July 2024, Ambassador: Germany Stops New Financing, Pulls out from Drills, Keeps Student Visas
• 7
  Civil Georgia, 30 July 2024, Denmark Fully Reviews Aid to Georgia, “Will Suspend Some Planned Activities and New Programming Support”
• 8
  Civil Georgia, 30 July 2024, Justice Minister Decrees Financial Reporting Department to Implement the Agents’ Law
• 9
  Civil Georgia, 17 September 2024, Parliament Adopts Anti-LGBT Legislation in Third Hearing
• 10
  Civil Georgia, 26 May 2024, Georgian Charter: President Proposes Unified Goals for Short-Term Parliament, Technical Government
• 11
  Civil Georgia, 3 June 2024, Opposition Parties Sign Georgian Charter
• 12
  Civil Georgia, 23 September 2024, Gakharia – For Georgia Signs President’s “Georgian Charter”
• 13
  The +/- calculation is based on the common result of UNM, European Georgia and Strategy Builder in 2020.
• 14
  The +/- calculation is based on the common result of Lelo and Citizens in 2020.
• 15
  The party had six MPs in parliament since 2021, when they split from Georgian Dream.
• 16
  Ten other parties on the ballot received a total of 43,981 votes (or 2.1%).
• 17
  CESKO reported a total of 2,111,834 votes. The actual sum of the reported votes and invalid votes as released by CESKO is 2,111,753, thus 81 votes short of the reported total turnout.
• 18
  This is the number on the official protocol of 16 November 2024. The sum of the invalid ballot count as stated on the 73 district protocols and the 67 protocols from abroad is 34,976. This excludes 1,643 votes declared invalid from precinct 22.69 (Marneuli).
• 19
  There is a discrepancy of 81 between the sum of the above numbers of the protocol and the reported grand total.
• 20
  CESKO, Dashboard election results
• 21
  CESKO, Summary Protocol Of the Final Results of the 26 October 2024 Parliamentary Elections of Georgia (pdf)
• 22
  CESKO, Minutes summarizing the voting results of election precincts established in another state (pdf)
• 23
  Civil Georgia, 26 October 2024, Exit Polls Show Conflicting Results as Polls Close
• 24
  Edison, 26 October 2024, Edison Research Exit Poll projects clear victory for opposition parties in Republic of Georgia Parliamentary Elections
• 25
  Civil Georgia, 26 October 2024, GD, Opposition Both Celebrate Victory
• 26
  Civil Georgia, 26 October 2024, Official Preliminary Results: Georgian Dream Leads with 52.99%
• 27
  Edison, 1 November 2024, Edison Research 2024 Republic of Georgia Exit Poll
• 28
  HarrisX, 31 October 2024, BREAKING: HarrisX Releases Final Georgia 2024 Exit Poll Analysis
• 29
  Civil Georgia, 26 October 2024, Polls Close with 58,94% Turnout.
• 30
  OSCE ODIHR, 24 June 2024, Needs Assessment Mission Report 20-24 May 2024 (pdf)
• 31
  IRI, 18 July 2024, Observation Mission Ahead of Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections
• 32
  Civil Georgia, 24 July 2024, NDI, IRI Launch Long-term Election Observation Missions
• 33
  France24, 28 October 2024, Protests erupt in Georgia after contested vote as Hungary’s Orban visits
• 34
  Radio Free Europe, 4 November 2024, Thousands Protest Georgia’s ‘Stolen Election’ In Tbilisi
• 35
  Associated Press, 12 November 2024, Thousands rally outside Georgian parliament to demand a new election towards European integration
• 36
  Civil Georgia, 7 November 2024, Tbilisi Court of Appeals Rejects Alleged Breach of Ballot Secrecy, Upholding Official Results
• 37
  Ibid.
• 38
  Civil Georgia, 17 November 2024, President Zurabishvili Challenges the Constitutionality of Elections in Court
• 39
  Civil Georgia, 3 December 2024, Breaking: Constitutional Court Rejects Appeals by President and Opposition MPs
• 40
  Civil Georgia, 12 November 2024, Coalition for Change, Unity-UNM Officially Renounce Their MP Mandates
• 41
  Civil Georgia, 15 November 2024, Strong Georgia Renounces MP Mandates
• 42
  Civil Georgia, 26 November 2024, Unity-UNM Appeals to CEC to Revoke its Party List
• 43
  IPN, 26 November 2024, Giorgi Gakharia: No one will pressure us to cancel the lists – we will not ask either the National Movement or Ivanishvili and his party, we will leave the mandates when and in such a form as we deem necessary
• 44
  IPN, 14 January 2025დავით მათიკაშვილი – ოპოზიციონერი დეპუტატებისთვის მანდატის შეწყვეტის საკითხზე პარლამენტი მაშინ იმსჯელებს, როცა საჭიროდ ჩათვლის
• 45
  IPN, 10 December 2024, ბიძინა ივანიშვილს, ირაკლი ღარიბაშვილს, მიხეილ ყაველაშვილს, ირაკლი კობახიძეს, მაკა ბოჭორიშვილს, ანრი ოხანაშვილს, დავით სონღულაშვილსა და მარიამ ქვრივიშვილს დეპუტატის უფლებამოსილება შეუწყდათ
• 46
  Netgazeti, 10 December 2024, პაატა სალია, არჩილ გორდულაძე და სხვები – „ოცნებამ“ 8 ახალი დეპუტატის უფლებამოსილება ცნო
• 47
  Radio Free Europe RFE/RL, 22 August 2019, More Rustavi-2 TV Journalists Quit After New Owner Fires Colleagues
• 48
  IPN, 5 February 2025, Committee on Procedural Issues supports termination of parliamentary mandates of 49 MPs
• 49
  IPN, 5 February 2025, 49 ოპოზიციონერ დეპუტატს სადეპუტატო უფლებამოსილება შეუწყდა – 150-წევრიანი პარლამენტი 101-წევრიანი გახდა
• 50
  Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 3 April 2025, ცოტნე კობერიძემ და ბორის (ჩელე) ყურუამ ზურა ჯაფარიძის „გირჩი – მეტი თავისუფლება“ დატოვეს
• 51
  IPN, 3 April 2025, Badri Grigalashvili is also leaving the party “Girchi – More Freedom”
• 52
  IPN, 6 February 2025, Irakli Kobakhidze: The best option would be for Gakharia’s party and the last representatives of the “National Movement” to lose their mandates – there is no place for any foreign agent in the parliament
• 53
  OC Media, 29 May 2025, Georgian Dream will revoke the mandates of Gakharia’s MPs from the opposition For Georgia party
• 54
  IPN, 30 June 2025, Parliamentary Committee on Procedural Issues and Rules to discuss early termination of powers of members of Gakharia for Georgia party on June 30
• 55
  IPN, 26 June 2025, Nino Tsilosani – Giorgi Gakharia and his party members are deliberately revoking immunity and mandate
• 56
  Civil Georgia, 2 July 2025, Georgian Dream Parliament Terminates 12 Gakharia Party Mandates
• 57
  IPN, 28 August 2025, Parliament to decide next week on recognizing the powers of replacement deputies for 12 terminated members of the “Gakharia for Georgia” party
• 58
  Radio Tavisupleba, 9 September 2025, გახარიას პარტიაში აცხადებენ, რომ “პოლიტიკური ბოიკოტის რეჟიმში რჩებიან”
• 59
  IPN, 20 October 2025, Gakharia for Georgia party stops boycott, enters parliament
• 60
  IPN, 27 October 2025, Rusudan Tevzadze announces she is renouncing her parliamentary mandate and leaving the “Gakharia for Georgia” party
• 61
  IPN, 13 December 2024, People’s Power leaves the parliamentary majority and joins the opposition
• 62
  Imedi, 20 August 2024, Ruling Georgian Dream party clarifies why it needs to secure constitutional majority in upcoming parliamentary elections
• 63
  IPN, 13 January 2025, Irakli Beraia has been appointed as Deputy Minister of Justice
• 64
  Civil Georgia, 3 April 2025, Irakli Beraia Appointed as Head of Finance Ministry’s Investigative Service
• 65
  Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 5 February 2025, “ქართულ ოცნებას” სამი “ოპოზიციონერი” გამოეყო
• 66
  IPN, 23 June 2025, პარლამენტში შექმნილი პოლიტიკური ჯგუფის „ევროპელი სოციალისტების“ შემადგენლობაში ცვლილებები განხორციელდა
• 67
  Civil Georgia, 16 December 2024, International Reactions to Kavelashvili’s Election
• 68
  Civil Georgia, International Reactions to Inauguration of Mikheil Kavelashvili as GD’s President-Elect, 30 December 2024
• 69
  The Guardian, 29 December 2024, Georgia’s pro-west president says she remains ‘only legitimate president’ as new leader sworn in
• 70
  IPN, 24 January 2024, Givi Mikanadze: Next week, at the PACE winter session, there will be an attempt to limit the authority of the delegation of the newly elected Parliament of Georgia – the Deep State does not accept the existence of a peace-oriented government in Georgia
• 71
  IPN, 3 February 2025, პარლამენტში “2003-2012 წლებში მოქმედი რეჟიმის და რეჟიმის პოლიტიკური თანამდებობის პირების საქმიანობის შემსწავლელი დროებითი საგამოძიებო კომისიის” შექმნის პროექტი ინიცირებულია
• 72
  IPN, 10 February 2025, 2003-2012 წლებში მოქმედი რეჟიმისა და მისი პოლიტიკური თანამდებობის პირების საქმიანობის შემსწავლელი დროებითი საგამოძიებო კომისიის პერსონალური შემადგენლობა ცნობილია
• 73
  IPN, 13 February 2025, 2003-2012 წლებში მოქმედი რეჟიმისა და მისი პოლიტიკური თანამდებობის პირების საქმიანობის შემსწავლელი“ დროებითი საგამოძიებო კომისია დღეს პირველ სხდომას გამართავს
• 74
  OC Media, 26 March 2025, Georgian prosecutors launch investigation into opposition leader Mamuka Khazaradze
• 75
  Civil Georgia, 14 April 2025, GD to Appeal to Constitutional Court to Ban Opposition Parties After Local Elections
• 76
  Civil Georgia, 14 April 2025, Gakharia Appears Before GD Parliamentary Investigative Commission
• 77
  Eastwatch, Jelger Groeneveld, 2019-, Territorial dispute Chorchana-Tsnelisi over old and “fake” maps
• 78
  Sakartvelos Ambebi, 14 June 2025, Gomelauri on Chorchana Checkpoint: We were informed post-factum. It was not coordinated
• 79
  Civil Georgia, Gakharia in Prosecution Crosshairs Over 2019 Chorchana Tensions, 14 April 2025
• 80
  Civil Georgia, 27 May 2025, GD Parliament Extends Mandate of UNM Investigative Commission
• 81
  Civil Georgia, Tsulukiani’s Investigative Commission Wraps Up, Report Expected in September, 4 August 2025
• 82
  Civil Georgia, 12 November 2025, Ex-PM Gakharia Charged in Absentia Over ‘Gavrilov’s Night,’ Chorchana Tensions
• 83
  Civil Georgia, 14 May 2025, Court Sends Former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili to Pre-trial Detention
• 84
  Civil Georgia, 29 May 2025, Opposition Leader Nika Melia Detained
• 85
  Civil Georgia, 13 June 2025, Court Sends Third Opposition Leader, Nika Gvaramia, to Detention Over Boycotting GD Commission
• 86
  Civil Georgia, 23 June 2025, Zurab Japaridze Sentenced to Seven Months in Jail in First Verdict for Defying GD Commission
• 87
  Civil Georgia, 23 June 2025, Mamuka Khazaradze Sentenced to Eight Months in Jail in Second Verdict for Defying GD Commission
• 88
  Civil Georgia, 23 June 2025, Badri Japaridze Sentenced to Eight Months in Jail in Third Verdict for Defying GD Commission
• 89
  Civil Georgia, 23 June 2025, Giorgi Vashadze Sentenced to Seven Months for Defying GD Commission
• 90
  Civil Georgia, 27 June 2025, Givi Targamadze Sentenced to Seven Months for Defying Tsulukiani Commission
• 91
  Civil Georgia, 27 June 2025, Nika Melia Sentenced to Eight Months for Defying Tsulukiani Commission
• 92
  Civil Georgia, 1 July 2025, Nika Gvaramia Sentenced to Eight Months in Prison for Defying Tsulukiani Commission
• 93
  Civil Georgia, 4 July 2025, Ex-Minister Okruashvili Sentenced to Eight Months in Prison for Defying Tsulukiani Commission
• 94
  Civil Georgia, 5 September 2025, Kavelashvili Pardons Lelo/Strong Georgia’s Khazaradze, Japaridze Ahead of Local Vote
• 95
  Civil Georgia, 6 November 2025, Georgian Authorities to Prosecute Eight Opposition Leaders for ‘Crimes Against State’
• 96
  Civil Georgia, 28 March 2025, GD to Ban Opposition Groups Under “Successor Parties” Law, Declare Them Unconstitutional
• 97
  IPN, 15 April 2025, Parliament supported the legislative package related to the ban on political parties in the first reading
• 98
  IPN, 15 April 2025, Parliament adopted in the first reading the legislative initiative according to which international donor organizations will no longer be able to issue grants without Government approval
• 99
  Civil Georgia, 28 October 2025, Ruling Party Appeals to Constitutional Court to Ban Three Major Opposition Forces
• 100
  Civil Georgia, 9 March 2025, “Freedom Square” Movement Becomes Political Party
• 101
  Civil Georgia, 6 June 2025, Anna Dolidze’s For People Leaves Lelo-Led Strong Georgia Coalition
• 102
  IPN, 6 June 2025, Ana Dolidze and For People Party leave Strong Georgia coalition, return to independent activities
• 103
  1TV, 3 April 2025, Tsotne Koberidze, Badri Grigalashvili, Boris Chele Kurua quit ‘Girchi – More Freedom
• 104
  Netgazeti, 24 July 2025, ანა დოლიძე მუნიციპალურ არჩევნებში მონაწილეობას არ მიიღებს
• 105
  IPN, 27 June 2025, Politics 27.06.2025 / 21:49aa Aleko Elisashvili: Let’s sit down, talk, and unite around Salome Zurabishvili – let’s not be afraid to say it, let’s proclaim it. She wouldn’t be a bad candidate for mayor
• 106
  The Messenger Online, 28 May 2025, Georgian Opposition Parties Face Dilemmas
• 107
  OC Media, 30 June 2025, Georgian opposition politician Khoshtaria starts hunger strike, joined by colleague and activists
• 108
  Civil Georgia, 5 July 2025, Lelo/Strong Georgia to Run in October Local Elections, Three Senior Members Dissent
• 109
  1TV, 5 July 2025, Freedom Square criticizes Strong Georgia for participating in elections
• 110
  IPN, 5 July 2025, Elene Khoshtaria: What a 4% party like Lelo does certainly doesn’t determine Georgia’s fate. Whether they are weak or traitors – let history judge that; As for us, let’s focus on our work
• 111
  IPN, 5 July 2025, Tina Bokuchava: This is a betrayal of the common struggle, a deal with the regime in exchange for an honorable second place. Today we witnessed Lelo’s moral death — in October, we will witness their electoral death as well
• 112
  IPN, 5 July 2025, Levan Gogichaishvili: Lelo – Strong Georgia’s decision is the right one, and I support it. We need to nominate joint, neutral candidates. As for the United National Movement, I’m not interested in their opinion
• 113
  IPN, 5 July 2025, Ana Natsvlishvili has left the political council of “Lelo – For a Strong Georgia”
• 114
  Civil Georgia, 14 July 2025, Lelo, Gakharia’s For Georgia Agree to Cooperate for Local Elections
• 115
  Civil Georgia, 1 June 2024, Georgians Gear Up for ‘Unprecedented’ Election Mobilization
• 116
  Legislative Herald of Georgia, Election Code of Georgia, Article 109.1, consolidated version 26 June 2024
• 117
  Civil Georgia, 7 December 2018, New Constitution Enters into Force
• 118
  Civil Georgia, 22 July 2023, Explainer | Why do the parties start to merge?
• 119
  CESKO, 21 August 2024, პარტიული სიების წარდგენის წესები არჩევნებში მონაწილე პარტიებისთვის
• 120
  International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), 22 November 2023, Use Of Electronic Technologies In The Voting Process: Assessment Of Electronic Machines Introduced In Georgia
• 121
  European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE), 2 April 2024, New Voting Technologies In Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections
• 122
  Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 19 August 2024, სკანდალი ფირმის გარშემო, რომლის ტექნოლოგიებითაც ტარდება არჩევნები საქართველოში – ქრთამი, ფულის გათეთრება და აშშ-ის ბრალდებები
• 123
  JAM News, 3 April 2024, “Crossing half the continent to cast a vote”: Georgians abroad want to participate in Georgia elections
• 124
  Civil Georgia, 27 May 2024, President Calls for ‘Full Mobilization’ of Diaspora in October Elections
• 125
  CESKO, 26 September 2024, “60 PECs Will Serve Voters Living Abroad in 42 Foreign Countries
• 126
  CESKO, 10 October 2024, Information On Participation Of Voters Living Abroad In Upcoming Elections
• 127
  Sakartvelos Ambebi – Georgian News, 11 October 2024, President Urges CEC to Establish Polling Station in Strasbourg
• 128
  IPN, 12 October 202, Chairman of the CEC on the request to open a polling station in Strasbourg: the institution is guided by the information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not on the basis of the president or any other institution4
• 129
  Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 1 April 2024, „გირჩი” და „ოცნება“ პარტიულ სიაში ქალთა კვოტირების გაუქმებაზე შეთანხმდნენ
• 130
  Civil Georgia, 1 July 2024, OSCE/ODIHR: Abolition of Women’s Quotas on Party Election Lists “Not Consistent” with Georgia’s Obligations
• 131
  Civil Georgia, 25 June 2024, Venice Commission Opinion on Abolishing Quotas on Women MPs
• 132
  Civil Georgia, 30 May 2024, Parliament Adopts Amendments to Election Code
• 133
  Civil Georgia, 25 June 2024, Venice Commission Critical in Follow-Up Opinion on Amendments to Electoral Code
• 134
  The Messenger, 17 July 2024, Georgian Dream and People’s Power Announce Joint Participation in Parliamentary Elections
• 135
  Open Caucasus Media, 21 July 2023, Georgia’s UNM and Strategy Aghmashenebeli to run joint election list
• 136
  Civil Georgia, 8 July 2024, UNM, Strategy Aghmashenebeli Announce Political Platform: ‘Unity – to Save Georgia’
• 137
  IPN, 1 August 2024, Giga Bokeria leaves “European Georgia”
• 138
  Civil Georgia, 17 July 2024, Three More Opposition Groups Join Forces Ahead of Crucial Elections
• 139
  Open Caucasus Media, 24 July 2024, Aleko Elisashvili’s Citizens Party ‘in negotiations’ with growing Georgian opposition alliance
• 140
  Civil Georgia, 9 July 2024, Ahali, Girchi-More Freedom and Droa Unite Ahead of Polls
• 141
  Open Caucasus Media, 11 June 2024, Georgia’s Alt Info to run in elections with Alliance of Patriots
• 142
  IPN, 20 June 2024, ქართული პრესის მიმოხილვა 20.06.2024
• 143
  Radio Free Europe, 25 July 2024, Never Mind Unseating Georgian Dream, Georgia’s Opposition Must First Overcome Internal Frictions
• 144
  IPN, 30 July 2024, Beka Liluashvili: The international arbitration court put an end to the Anaklia port case – Mamuka Khazaradze lost the dispute, it will be difficult for him, but he will have to admit it
• 145
  CESKO, 1 September 2024, The Registration Of Parties For The October 26 Parliamentary Elections In The CEC Has Been Completed
• 146
  CESKO, Elections Sequence Numbers Of Election Subjects
• 147
  CESKO, Election Subjects – Information On Registration Procedures For Parties Participating In The Parliamentary Elections Of Georgia
• 148
  CESKO, 7 October 2024, Candidate list Georgian Unity and Development Party (pdf)
• 149
  Rebranded as “New Unity Gvaramia Melia” after Akhali took over the registration of State for the People. See timeline 19 July 2024.
• 150
  CESKO, 8 October 2024, Candidate list New Unity Gvaramia Melia (pdf)
• 151
  CESKO, 8 October 2024, Candidate list Unity – National Movement (pdf)
• 152
  CESKO, 1 October 2024, Candidate list European Democrats (pdf)
• 153
  CESKO, 1 October 2024, Candidate list Alliance of Patriots of Georgia (pdf)
• 154
  Radio Tavisupleba, 28 August 2024, ამ არჩევნებისთვის „ლელომ“ სახელი გადაირქვა
• 155
  CESKO, 4 October 2024, Candidate list Strong Georgia (pdf)
• 156
  CESKO, 7 October 2024, Candidate list Labour Party of Georgia (pdf)
• 157
  CESKO, 5 October 2024, Candidate list Our United Georgia (pdf)
• 158
  CESKO, 4 October 2024, Candidate list Change Georgia (pdf)
• 159
  CESKO, 5 October 2024, Candidate list Sakartvelo (“Georgia”) (pdf)
• 160
  CESKO, 7 October 2024, Candidate list Free Georgia (pdf)
• 161
  CESKO, 7 October 2024, Candidate list Tribuna (pdf)
• 162
  Registered as party chairman, but left the party ahead of the elections.
• 163
  CESKO, 8 October 2024, Candidate list Chven (pdf)
• 164
  Revised list after nine candidates withdrew on 7 October 2024.
• 165
  CESKO, 1 October 2024, Candidate list Gakharia for Georgia (pdf)
• 166
  CESKO, 1 October 2024, Candidate list Left Alliance (pdf)
• 167
  CESKO, 5 October 2024, Candidate list Georgian Unity (pdf)
• 168
  CESKO, 1 October 2024, Candidate list Girchi (pdf)
• 169
  CESKO, 1 October 2024, Candidate list Georgian Dream (pdf)
• 170
  CESKO, Election Subjects
• 171
  CESKO, October 2024, Registered Election Subjects for the October 26, 2024 Parliamentary Elections (pdf)
• 172
  Legislative Herald of Georgia, Election Code of Georgia, consolidated version 26 June 2024
• 173
  IPN, 29 August 2024, ცესკო განმარტავს, რატომ ეთქვა უარი არჩევნებში რეგისტრაციაზე ფრიდონ ინჯიას, შოთა შალელაშვილის და აკაკი ასათიანის პარტიებს
• 174
  Reasons of refusal or cancellation of the registration as per Election Code article 38 or 113 and subsequent clauses (#). See footer for the link to the Election Code.
• 175
  Part of “Strong Georgia” alliance (#9)
• 176
  Part of “Strong Georgia” alliance (#9)
• 177
  Part of “Unity” alliance (#5).
• 178
  Part of “Unity” alliance (#5); Actual registration changed to ‘Yes to Europe – Strategy Aghmashenebeli’.
• 179
  CESKO, Election Subjects Which Were Given Refusal To Be Registered/Their Registration Was Cancelled (pdf), 16 August 2024
• 180
  CESKO, 8 October 2024, Election Subjects Which Were Given Refusal To Be Registered/Their Registration Was Cancelled – English (pdf)
• 181
  CESKO, 8 October 2024, Election Subjects Which Were Given Refusal To Be Registered/Their Registration Was Cancelled – Georgian (pdf)
• 182
  Legislative Herald of Georgia, Election Code of Georgia, consolidated version 26 June 2024
• 183
  Civil Georgia, 9 October 2024, October Elections: Odds, Context, Past Trends
• 184
  Radio Tavisupleba, 15 August 2024, “ოცნების” წინასწარი რეიტინგები და ცდომილებები შედეგებში
• 185
  Agenda, 8 October 2020, GD chairman Ivanishvili: ‘I condemn all forms of violence undermining electoral process, quality of democracy’
• 186
  PolitPro, Georgia: All election polls at a glance
• 187
  Facebook Giga Bokeria, 8 July 2024
• 188
  Formula TV, 28 July 2024, როგორია პარტიების რეიტინგი – Edison Research-ის კვლევა
• 189
  JAM News, 28 September 2024, Edison Research’s pre-election survey in Georgia: “Dream” at 32% and “National Movement” at 20%
• 190
  Formula TV, 23 October 2024, როგორია პარტიების რეიტინგი – Edison Research-ის კვლევა 1-18 ოქტომბერი
• 191
  JAM News, 20 September 2024, Georgia elections: 71% Support giving another party a chance’
• 192
  Imedi, 10 April 2024, GORBI poll shows if parliamentary elections were held this week, Georgian Dream party would receive 60.4% of votes
• 193
  Imedi, 14 August 2024, GORBI poll shows if parliamentary elections were held this week, Georgian Dream party would receive 59.3% of votes
• 194
  Imedi, 8 October 2024, GORBI poll shows if parliamentary elections were held this week, Georgian Dream party would receive 59.5% of votes
• 195
  Imedi, 23 October 2024, GORBI poll shows if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, Georgian Dream party would receive 60.2% of votes
• 196
  Mtavari, 23 October 2024, ბრიტანული კომპანია SAVANTA-ს გამოკითხვა | კვლევის შედეგები სრულად
• 197
  This is the number on the official protocol of 16 November 2024. The sum of the invalid ballot count as stated on the 73 district protocols and the 67 protocols from abroad is 34,976. This excludes 1,643 votes declared invalid from precinct 22.69 (Marneuli). This precinct was prematurely closed on election day due to irregularities. All cast ballots until that moment were declared invalid. However, there was a slight discrepancy of typically a few ballots between the invalid ballot count noted on the majority of the district protocols and the actual sum (cast ballot total minus valid party votes). According to that sum, the total invalid / missing would have been 35,001 ballots.
• 198
  CESKO reported a total of 2,111,834 votes. The actual sum of the reported votes per party and invalid votes as released by CESKO is 2,111,753, thus 81 votes short of the reported total cast votes (turnout).
• 199
  CESKO, Summary Protocol Of the Final Results of the 26 October 2024 Parliamentary Elections of Georgia (pdf)
• 200
  Dashboard election results
• 201
  IPN, 10 December 2024, ბიძინა ივანიშვილს, ირაკლი ღარიბაშვილს, მიხეილ ყაველაშვილს, ირაკლი კობახიძეს, მაკა ბოჭორიშვილს, ანრი ოხანაშვილს, დავით სონღულაშვილსა და მარიამ ქვრივიშვილს დეპუტატის უფლებამოსილება შეუწყდათ
• 202
  IPN, 23 June 2025, პარლამენტში შექმნილი პოლიტიკური ჯგუფის „ევროპელი სოციალისტების“ შემადგენლობაში ცვლილებები განხორციელდა
• 203
  Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 5 February 2025, “ქართულ ოცნებას” სამი “ოპოზიციონერი” გამოეყო
• 204
  IPN, 13 December 2024, People’s Power leaves the parliamentary majority and joins the opposition
• 205
  IPN, 29 October 2025 , პარლამენტში დავით კოდუას ადგილმონაცვლედ ზურაბ ქადაგიძე შედის
• 206
  Civil Georgia, 5 February 2025, GD Terminates Mandates of 49 Opposition MPs, Stages New Parliamentary Group Formation
• 207
  IPN, 13 January 2025, Irakli Beraia has been appointed as Deputy Minister of Justice
• 208
  Civil Georgia, 2 July 2025, New MP, Education Committee Chair in GD Parliament
• 209
  The coalition was carried on the party registration of Akhali, hence candidates of Akhali were not registered as ‘non-partisan’ (NP).
• 210
  IPN, 5 February 2025, 49 ოპოზიციონერ დეპუტატს სადეპუტატო უფლებამოსილება შეუწყდა – 150-წევრიანი პარლამენტი 101-წევრიანი გახდა
• 211
  The coalition was carried on the party registration of UNM, hence candidates of UNM were not registered as ‘non-partisan’ (NP).
• 212
  The coalition was carried on the party registration of Lelo for Georgia, hence candidates of Lelo were not registered as ‘non-partisan’ (NP).
• 213
  Civil Georgia, 2 July 2025, Georgian Dream Parliament Terminates 12 Gakharia Party Mandates
• 214
  CESKO, Summary Protocol Of the Final Results of the 26 October 2024 Parliamentary Elections of Georgia (pdf)
• 215
  Netgazeti, 10 December 2024, პაატა სალია, არჩილ გორდულაძე და სხვები – „ოცნებამ“ 8 ახალი დეპუტატის უფლებამოსილება ცნო
• 216
  Civil Georgia, 2 April 2025, GD Cabinet Reshuffled
• 217
  IPN, 6 February 2025, „ქართულ ოცნებას“ პარლამენტში ახალი წევრი ჰყავს – ირაკლი ბერაიას ადგილმონაცვლედ გრიგოლ აბესაძის უფლებამოსილება ცნეს
• 218
  Publika, 16 April 2025, პაატა სალიას ადგილმონაცვლე იოსებ ჯორბენაძე გახდა
• 219
  Civil Georgia, 2 July 2025, New MP, Education Committee Chair in GD Parliament
• 220
  Publika, 3 September 2025, „ოცნების“ პარლამენტში მდინარაძის ადგილმონაცვლე თორნიკე ფაღავა გახდა
  
• 221
  IPN, 29 October 2025 , პარლამენტში დავით კოდუას ადგილმონაცვლედ ზურაბ ქადაგიძე შედის
• 222
  IPN, 2 September 2025, Parliament recognizes mandates of 12 members of Gakharia for Georgia party
• 223
  IPN, 27 October 2025, Rusudan Tevzadze announces she is renouncing her parliamentary mandate and leaving the “Gakharia for Georgia” party
• 224
  According to the district protocols. There are some discrepancies between the invalid ballot count noted on the protocol and the delta of cast minus valid party votes. Total discrepancy over all districts is 31 votes on a grand total of 35,011. All cast and party sums match.
• 225
  The grand total of registered voters based on the districts and abroad is 3,591,699, but a large number of voters registered abroad are duplicate with domestically registered voters. CESKO reported a grand total of 3,508,294 registered (unique) voters. The sum of invalid ballots is 34,976, but the number on the final protocol is 34,974.
• 226
  CESKO, Districts 2024 elections
• 227
  CESKO, 22 October 2024, Number of voters in each election district as of 14 October 2024
• 228
  CESKO, 13 November 2024, არჩევნებში მონაწილეთა რაოდენობა შემაჯამებელი ოქმების მიხედვით გენდერული სტატისტიკა (ქვეყნის მასშტაბით) (pdf)
• 229
  CESKO, 30 August 2024, Number of voters in each election district as of 15 July 2024
• 230
  Actual difference calculation is 3.
• 231
  Actual difference calculation is 5.
• 232
  Actual difference calculation is 8.
• 233
  Actual difference calculation is 13.
• 234
  8 invalid noted on protocol, but the total is equal to the sum of the (valid) party votes. Likely this was erroneously not entered as 751.
• 235
  Actual difference calculation is 8.
• 236
  35 invalid noted on protocol, but the total is equal to the sum of the (valid) party votes. Likely this was erroneously not entered as 757.
• 237
  Actual difference calculation is 5.
• 238
  Actual difference calculation is 4.
• 239
  CESKO, 26 September 2024, Election precincts in other states for the elections of the Parliament of Georgia on October 26, 2024 (pdf)
• 240
  CESKO, 11 October 2024, საქართველოს პარლამენტის 2024 წლის 26 ოქტომბრის არჩევნებისთვის სხვა სახელმწიფოში საარჩევნო უბნები (pdf)
• 241
  CESKO, 16 October 2024, საქართველოს პარლამენტის 2024 წლის 26 ოქტომბრის არჩევნებისთვის სხვა სახელმწიფოში საარჩევნო უბნების შემადგენლობა (pdf)
• 242
  CESKO, Dashboard election results